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I. INTRODUCTION
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited to join the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) during the NATO Madrid Summit held in July 1997. These
three countries have made considerable improvement in the way of democratization,
modernization of their military forces, and the establishment of civil control over the
military. These aspects made the NATO invitation possible. In December 1997, the
negotiations on accession were successfully finished. The ratification procedures by
NATO members are currently under way. With the ratification of accession protocols by
the legislation of the United States in May 1998, the planned deadline— April 1999 —
for finishing the first round ofNATO enlargement has become attainable. Now, it is the
prospective members' turn to continue the preparation process that will enable them to
contribute to the common goal of the Alliance.
Hungary, too, has to possess a satisfactory mix of external policy tools to provide
for security. The formulation of an external policy should start with an analysis of the
security environment the country faces. Based on the analysis, the actual sources of the
security threats have been identified. In turn, the established external policy should meet
all of the prevailing challenges. Being a member of an alliance, a country should also
incorporate into its policy the expectations of its allies.
Nevertheless, the assumed policy has to be based on the economic and other
capabilities of the country. It is not in the interest of the Alliance to obligate one of its
members to assume provisions requiring extremely high resources. What NATO needs,
while it expands, are countries possessing a strong economic basis that allows for the
maintenance of modem military forces, an external policy which spreads western values,
and strong stabilizing forces in their close environment. Because ofHungary's geographic
situation, earlier connections with former socialist countries can fulfill these expectations.
As American Deputy Secretary ofDefense John Hamre stated:
The key to preventing war in Europe in the 21st Century is to spread the
democracy, stability, and prosperity of Western Europe into East and
Central Europe, all the way to Russia. And the key to that is by enlarging
NATO — inviting new members into the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. 1
A. BACKGROUND
For establishing a portfolio of security provisions for Hungary, this thesis has used
the latest version of economic models on alliances. The center of the model is the theory
of public goods because the defense product possesses the features of nonrivalry and
nonexcludability in defining the public character of those provisions.
The theory of public goods has practically evolved since the inception of NATO.
The aim has been to reach an optimal operating level of the alliance and to provide an
equality in contributions by individual nations. However, the original model, based purely
on the theory of public goods with a single defense capability, and its following versions,
Address by John Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense at a Peace Luncheon in Birmingham, Alabama,
November 1, 1997.
the joint product model assuming the diversity of different weapons, have drawn a
conclusion about the "free ride" ofsome members at the expense of others.
The end of the cold war has put military threat and military provision in the last
place in the security policy of a majority of countries. Therefore, it is understandable that
the value of military means has been inflated, although the necessity for maintaining an
adequate defense capability has not disappeared. Other tools of security provisions, such
as maintaining good international relations and building economic interdependences have
come to the fore. This shift in security policies provides a solid basis for the proposed
model of alliances. The model of multiple public good takes into account several
dimensions of security provisions, or to put it differently, the model incorporates both
military and non military tools of security policy. Consequently, using the multiple public
goods model for suggesting a mix of security tools for Hungary is a satisfactory approach.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question for this thesis is the following:
What should be the international/intra-alliance strategy/policy ofHungary that ensures
the security and economic prosperity of the country while considering the common
purpose of the alliance?
The study also examines the following secondary research questions:
1. How can the threat perception in the post-Cold War era be characterized?
2. What are the main sources of threats and instability in the Central and Eastern
European (CEE) region?
3. What are the assumptions of the multiple product model suggested by Mark
Boyer, associate professor of political science at the University of Connecticut?
4. Has Hungary committed herself to NATO membership?
5. What would be Hungary's contribution to the Alliance?
C. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis attempts to accomplish the examination of three main issues in three
chapters. The second chapter deals with questions of security perceptions. In this chapter
there is an introduction of the approach to security at the end of 1990s, which follows the
end of the Cold War. Second, an analysis of Hungary's close security environment
identifies the particular security challenges the country and NATO face in the CEE region.
The third chapter presents the multiple public good model developed by Mark
Boyer. Based upon Boyer's work, an evaluation of earlier economic models of defense
alliances show that the multiple public good model offers approaches to overcome the
highly restrictive assumptions of the former models. The model also provides evidence
that the free riding hypothesis — some members get free security provisions at the
expense of the others — cannot be proven if the evaluation of contributions goes beyond
a strictly military dimension of provisions. Incorporated into the model are the trade of
public goods, the notion of comparative advantages, and the role of negotiations that will
take the alliance closer to an optimal utilization of resources.
Chapter IV examines two issues. First is Hungary's commitment to NATO. The
commitment is an important dimension for the Alliance, because it reveals the probability
of delivering the expected share of security products by single members. Hungary's
devotion to NATO lays on two factors: the recognition by the country that the cheapest,
and most effective way to provide for her security is the membership in NATO, while the
second factor is the dedication of domestic stakeholders to the Alliance. The unanimous
Parliamentary voting about NATO membership on July 17, 1997 showed that the major
political parties are committed to the Alliance. The referendum held in November 1997
reinforced that the general public also favors the membership into the organization.
The second issue of Chapter IV is a proposed mix of security policies for Hungary
as a contribution to the common provision. Three fields are especially important:
maintaining good connections with neighbors; pursuing a moderate minority policy,; and
improving the country's defense capability.
The fifth chapter sums up the results and conclusions of the work. It also offers
two sets of recommendations. These recommendations consider some aspects of
implementation of Hungary's security policy, as well as some prospective ideaas for
further research and the development of the multiple public good model.

H. SECURITY THREATS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (CEE)
Three issues preceded Hungary's invitation to NATO membership. First, the
historical development in Europe changed the character of the security environment. The
end of bipolarity made the invitation of a former adversary possible. Second, the
prevailing security threats and the demise of the Warsaw Pact made it necessary for
Hungary to provide for her own security. The country saw membership in NATO as the
most appropriate solution to meet the security challenges she faces. Finally, a decade of
development in NATO made it feasible to acquire new members.
This chapter takes a global approach to examine the security perception at the end
of 1990s. The analysis concludes that the threat to security is recently perceived in more
than just military terms. The subchapter describes four different spheres of security:
military, economic, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ecological
dimensions.
The next section provides a regional analysis. This investigation focuses on
Hungary's close security environment and describes the situation in neighboring countries.
Upon analysis, one can conclude that the possibility of a large-scale conflict or a total war
against Hungary and NATO has diminished, and has become practically improbable.
However, other sources of conflicts still prevail. Crises can originate from nationalism,
undemocratic practices, and the main security concerns in the CEE region are economic
difficulties and problems of economic transformation. The results of the test are
summarized in Table 1 which also offers four different future scenarios of the political
development in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. The four scenarios are:
the most optimistic— the "era of peaceful cooperation and development," the realistic
and highly probable — the "rolling down of a new iron curtain"; the two dangerous and
worrying — "Balkans on fire", and "in the name of Russian brethren" are outcomes of
national hostilities and Russia's hegemonic aspirations.
A. GLOBAL THREATS TO SECURITY AT THE END OF THE CENTURY
The national security policy of a country emantes from the international
environment and security challenges the country and the international community face.
Recently, security cannot be described in mere military terms. It should be considered in a
broader sense, though the military considerations have not disappeared even with the
termination of the Cold War. To sketch an overall picture of recent security challenges in
Europe, we can consider the military, economic, ecological threats, and the dangers from
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Obviously, the challenges offered here
are only an assortment of risks. Other relevant issues are the growing international crime,
drug trafficking, international migration, problems with refugees, to name a few.
On the other hand, the broadening of the perception about threats and security
goes in parallel with the formation ofthe three different levels of security challenges. On
the first level, threats are analyzed in connection with a single state. Political and military
menaces could be approached from this low perspective. The second level threats can be
defined in a regional or systemic context. The political and military dimensions can also be
interpreted on this level in the sense that security of a single country is not separable from
the security of its neighbors. The economic security also belongs to this second level
because most of the countries are dependent on other states for some resources, like
energy or some minerals. Just a few countries possessing huge natural and economic
resources can reach prosperity in circumstances of autarky. The third level of security can
be found on a global scale. The example of this is an ecological threat. The greenhouse
effect does not respect national borders and cannot be stopped at the boundary of regions.
The catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1989 did not also stop at the borders of Ukraine. It
affected many European countries as well.
1. Military Threats
The collapse of the socialist system and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have
radically changed the European security environment. With the end of the forty-four year
hostility and the emergence of new democratic regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the
possibility of war has diminished. As Stephan Van Evera points out, the probability of a
large-scale military attack practically disappeared:
[T]he domestic structures of most European states have changed in ways
that make war far less likely than before 1945. The most significant
domestic changes include the waning of militarism and hypernationalism.
Others include the spread of democracy, the leveling of formerly stratified
European societies, the resulting evaporation of "social imperial" motives
for war, and the disappearance of states governed by revolutionary elites.
These changes have removed important causes of Europe's past wars,
especially the two world wars. 2
However, possibilities for crises and "little local wars"
3
still prevail. For example,
the historical heritage of the region around Hungary carries the risk of further hostilities in
itself.
All over Eastern Europe, people have stayed still while borders have
changed. The peace settlement after the first world war, for example,
stripped Hungary of two-thirds of its territory and half of its population.
At its extreme, this mismatch of borders and people has produced war in
the former Yugoslavia. But disputes simmer throughout the rest of the
region, too. Czechoslovakia has broken in two. Hungary and Slovakia
are engaged in a war ofwords over the largest civil-engineering project in
Europe, a dam on the river Danube at Gabchikovo. The border of the
Soviet Union is speckled with conflicting claims. The Slavs of eastern
Moldova are fighting a war against the Moldovan government lest it vote
for reunification with Romania. And so on. 4
Figure 1 in the Appendix illustrates losses of Hungary in the 1920 Paris peace
agreement which closed the First World War. The main problem in this respect does not
occur as Hungary's irredentist territorial claims, though some extremists can talk about the
necessity of border revisions. The real danger is the occurrence of friction between
countries because of the mistreatment of national minorities, or emergence of hostility
against ethnic groups to divert the attention from deeper problems.
2
Van Evera, S., "The Domestic Sources ofPeace and War in the New Europe " in The Future of
European Security, ed. by Crawford, Beverly, Center for German and European Studies, University of
California at Berkeley, 1992, p. 171.
3
The term was used to title an article in The Economist March 13, 1993, p. 17.
4
"Little Local Wars?, " The Economist March 13, 1993, p. 17.
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2. Economic Threats
The main imperative of the two world wars was the strife of the European states
for the possibilities of market penetration, and more over for the access to natural
resources in different, and often distant parts of the world. The colonization of 18th and
19th centuries was complete while Germany, Italy, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, and
Japan were left out of this process. Also, one main reason causing the collapse of the
socialist system in 1989 was the economic situation in those countries. By the 1980s,
Hungary had a large international debt and very few chances to pay the huge debt service
based on the low effectiveness of the socialist economy. These facts, and others, such as
the shock of the two oil crises, also put economic factors at the fore of security thinking.
In a primary understanding, economic pressure from the side of a country or group
of countries is perceived as an economic threat. In this sense, an economic threat is an
embargo or the limitation of a country's access to the resources of energy or raw materials
that are critical to the country's survival. This kind of action can be a form of punishment
for a country's bad international behavior. An example of a similar incident is the
embargo against Iraq for its noncompliance with UN resolutions. Nevertheless, collective
economic sanctions can be avoided by obeying the norms of international relations. An
embargo can be launched and be really successful if its use is based on a consensus of the
entire community of nations.
11
On the other hand, other types of economic threats are hard to define as exactly as
military threats. Therefore, the next two issues are mentioned not in terms of threats but
in the context of economic security. The conventional instrumental approach of economic
security emphasizes the connection between economic growth and military capabilities.
The focus is on the economic constraint to the military spending. Here, the main question
is the allocation of scarce resources between butter and guns. Here, defense spending
through military production and a "spin off" of the modernization can play the role of a
facilitator. On the other hand, an unbalanced allocation of resources in favor of the
military spending can subvert the economic growth of a country. 5
The instrumental approach to economic security has its own meaning for the new
market economies ofEastern Europe. The transformation from the command economy to
the free market in Hungary, for example, has been accompanied by a severe decrease in
industrial production, hard budgetary restrictions, austerity programs, inflation, and so on.
For example, the defense spending of Hungary fell 50% in real terms for the period 1989
to 1994, and remained on that level for the last years. Cuts in the military budget was
necessary for a successful change to the market system, and for the economic recovery.
Although, the macroeconomic indicators for 1997 are promising, the fragility of the
Hungarian economy does not allow a sharp increase in military spending in spite of the
need to change the obsolete equipment of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Therefore, a
A good case in the point is the situation around North and South Korea. While South Korea under a US
defense guarantee allocated its budget in a way that promoted the economic growth of the country; the
North Korean defense burden hindered the country's economic prosperity.
12
sharp increase of military spending is not feasible because of its restrictive consequences
on the macroeconomic situation.
The next level to define economic security is its systemic treatment. In this
context, Sperling and Kirchner underline three distinctive elements of economic security:
We believe that economic security has three identifiable and separable
elements. First, economic security reflects concern over the ability of the
state to protect the social and economic fabric of a society. Second,
economic security involves the ability of the state to act as effective
gatekeeper and to maintain societal integrity. Third, economic security
concerns the ability of the state in cooperation with others to foster a stable
international economic environment in order to reinforce cooperation in the
military sector as well as to extract the welfare gains of openness. 6
In this later perspective, economic security focuses on the protection of the welfare
state, willingness to defend economic interests of single nations, and also the necessity to
maintain close economic relations, and economic interdependencies on a global scale.
Looking at the latest developments in Europe, the systemic approach seems to have a
solid base. Moreover, in the contemporary Europe the military and economic dimensions
of security are interrelated. Sperling and Kirchner noted:
The security of post-Cold War Europe demands a broader, systemic
definition of the relationship between the economic and military dimensions
of security; it requires that the economic dimension be treated as an integral
part of the overall security system rather than as an adjunct to the military
dimension of security at the national level. 7
6




This definition aims to achieve an international system which is structured to
ensure a stable and secure environment supporting the political, the military, and also the
economic sectors of international relations. Therefore, the security architecture of Europe
should be limited to the two dimensions, but there the consideration of the intersections
and consequences of the intersection of military and economic fields is imperative. This
direction of security thinking started from the recognition that a pure military approach
security failed. A system in which the members of it are bound through a dense net of
economic relations can guarantee more security than a system of states operating in
separation seeking self-sufficiency. Thus, the security dilemma operates on the economic
field. An attempt of a state for "absolute security" through economic isolation can be
perceived by others as a hostile aspiration and so reduce the over all security. 8
3. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
It has been just a few years ago that the world became aware of the threat posed
by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The traditional methods of
prevention failed at least twice for the last seven years. The UN inspections following the
Operation Desert Storm revealed that Iraq was far more ahead in its NBC and missile
programs than the intelligence of allied forces originally assessed. The second similar case
was that ofNorth Korea. Evidence showed that Korea acquired the capability to produce
A comprehensive analysis of economic threats and security is offered by Robert Cooper in the book
Global Security ed. by Eric Grove, Brassey's (UK), 1991.
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and possess a nuclear weapon. Both of the countries violated basic arms-control contracts
without detection by the international community and had obtained the materials and
knowledge to produce NBC9 weapons.
The proliferation of NBC weapons can occur on two ways. First, several
countries of the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Asia might develop and obtain their own
potential to produce NBC agents and means of their delivery. Second, weapons of mass
destruction can spread from the countries already possessing these weapons to other
regions of the world. This kind of threat can originate especially from member-states of
the former Soviet Union. The situation is more frightening if we take into account the
increase and perspectives ofthe organized crime.
Three kinds ofNBC weapons compose a particular threat. Nuclear weapons are
the most popular in proliferant countries. The development and production of a few
rudimentary nuclear bombs or warheads do not constitute an especially difficult task.
Biological weapons are the cheapest among the weapons of mass destruction; also, the
dual-used technologies involved in its production are well known everywhere. The
chemical weapon is perceived in proliferant countries as a highly effective and destructive
military device. Over all, NBC weapons are very attractive for several states because of
their significant psychological, political, and military advantages.
9
Nuclear, biological, and chemical.
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Robert Joseph, in his article "NATO's Role in Counter-Proliferation, " analyzes
the threats of NBC proliferation. His observation directs the attention to the dangers
implied in the spread ofNBC capabilities:
The "strategic personalities" of the regional proliferators are very different,
and more dangerous than those of the former Warsaw Pact states. In
particular, such states would be less likely to act according to the "rules" of
deterrence and would be more prone to take risks in order to advance the
leadership's interests. Proliferant states would also be less likely to have
effective command and control, raising the risk of accidental or
unauthorized use. 10
4. Ecological Threats
Humankind, through radical changes and penetrating the environment, threatens its
own survival. The footsteps of our actions are exhaustion of natural resources, pollution
of woods, lakes, rivers, and oceans. The exhausting gases from cars and factories cause
the greenhouse effect. For a long time, these threats were internal, as there were no sound
arguments to intervene into the matters of others states.
Today, the ecological threat has become globalized. The quantity of pollution, and
the consequences of single events or accidents pose an enormous danger to neighboring
and even distant countries. Different countries treat their own water resources differently.
Diversions of rivers can yield harmful consequences for the ecology of certain regions
sometimes on the territory of neighboring states. Problems such as these, and other issues
connected with pollution, affect different countries to different extents. For example, coal
Joseph, R. "NATO 's Role in Counter-Proliferation " in NATO's Transformation, ed. by Gordon, P. H.,
Rowman & Littlefleld Publishers, Inc., 1997, p. 247.
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exporting countries could be hit by a decision to decrease the emission of carbon-dioxide,
and carbon-monoxide. Building dams on border rivers to produce electricity can hurt the
interest of the other party by threatening it with an ecological catastrophe or the polluting
of pure water resources. Therefore, ecological issues constitute a new set of international
conflicts. Besides, the modernization of backward countries, exhaustion of energy
resources, spreading of pollution across boundaries will probably cause even more
difficulties and clashes in the future.
B. HUNGARY'S CLOSE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: EXTERNAL
STAKEHOLDERS IN HUNGARY'S SECURITY
The formulation of the international and security policy of a country has to be
based on the assessment of the situation in the close environment. This part of the essay
puts five countries— Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Russia—
into the focus of inquiry. Hungary shares borders with three other countries— Austria,
Slovenia, and Croatia — and the Central and Eastern European region consists of
additional countries which are equally relevant for Hungary to formulate its policy.
However, the analysis is limited to those five because they can be defined as the most
problematic or determining forces in the region.
The evaluation of these five countries embraces their political situation, economic
development, military forces, and foreign policy. The conclusion from the analysis is that
there are two really hot issues for the region. First, the prevailing ethnic disputes, like the
17
situation in Kosovo, or the question of the 22 million Russians outside Russia, causes
instability in the region. The second issue is the harsh economic situation in the countries,
which impedes the democratization process, strengthens ethnic hostilities, and gives basis
for the emergence of extremists forces on the political arena.
The results ofthe investigation are summarized in Table 1 which also offers some
forecast of the future development in the region. Based on the investigation of the
countries, four different scenarios emerged. The "peaceful cooperation and development"
is an idealistic case, and constitutes a low probability of success in the short run. The
"rolling down of a new iron curtain" seems to be the trend in Europe which threatens with
a recurrence of the Cold War. The ethnic disputes, strives for political power or
hegemonic ambitions may result in new military conflicts: "Balkans on fire", and "in the
name ofRussian brethren" scenarios.
1. Slovakia
Slovakia, the northern neighbor of Hungary, is a new country which appeared on
the international arena after the split of Czechoslovakia in January 1993. The size of
Slovakia by its territory, population, and economy is somewhat smaller than Hungary but
the presence of Hungarian minorities and the prevailing issues of controversy between the
two states make Slovakia an important stakeholder in Hungary's security. Slovakia is
also important for both Hungary and NATO because it divides Hungary from the NATO
area.
18
Democratization, political stability. The main concern around Slovakia, and the
reason for being left out ofNATO and EU enlargement, is its deviation from democratic
rules and political instability. The three most problematic issues are the disputes with the
Hungarian minority, the continuing political instability, and the conflict between President
Michal Kovac, and the Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. 11
Disputes with the Hungarian ethnic minority have become more intense since June
1992. Hungarian deputies to the Slovak National Council opposed the new Constitution
for it did not protect the rights of ethnic minorities. There were also several violations of
the rights of Hungarians. For example, the new Slovakian language law acknowledges
only the Slovakian in the civil service, on road signs, and in advertisements. Hungarian
language road signs were removed. Even the OSCE High Commissioner on National
minorities, Max van der Stole, criticized the Slovak government's arrangement,
particularly the termination of the use of minority languages in offices in Slovakia. 12
For the last six years, Slovakia has had three different governments. The first
Meciar government was removed in March 1 994 with a vote of no-confidence a year after
assuming the office. The following Moravcik government tried to pursue a more
moderate internal policy. Yet Meciar' s Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in a
coalition with Slovak Farmers Party won elections in October 1994. After his victory,
Meciar formed a coalition government with the extreme-right Slovak National Party
Jeffrey Simon offers a detailed analysis in his book NATO Enlargement and Central Europe , NDU
Press, 1996.
12
Simon, J., NATO Enlargement and Central Europe . NDU Press, 1996, p. 276.
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(SNS) and the left-wing Association of Slovak Workers (ASW). Having in mind a
coalition of parties with such a diverse set of values, one can hardly imagine smooth
common governance.
Both terms of Vladimir Meciar were characterized by continuous conflicts between
the President and the Prime Minister. Meciar cut the budget of the president's offices by
50% at the beginning of his second term. The President could not prevent the law about
the Slovak Information Service. The law put the supervision of the intelligence services in
hands of only the ruling parties. It seems that the Constitution did not provide sufficient
power for the President to balance the actions of the government. The weaknesses of the
Constitution made it also possible that this spring the National Council failed to elect a
new president at the termination of Kovac's term. The result is that Meciar temporarily
assumed the President's office, too, until the presidential election could be repeated.
Thus, the current internal situation suggests some problems around the Slovak
Constitution. The democratic institutions have not been well establishedt in the country
yet. Therefore, Vladimir Meciar' s strong personality can influence the entire internal
political arena:
He [Mr. Meciar] is authoritarian, even thuggish. The coalition he heads is
intolerant and chauvinistic. He has crudely tried to unseat Slovakian
president, Michal Kovac. His intelligence services, in a bizarre episode
involving weird business dealings and political intrigue, probably kidnapped
Mr. Kovac's son, filled him with booze, and had him driven across the
border and dumped in Austria. 13
13
'Slovakia. The Visegrad three... ," The Economist March 9 1996, p. 55.
20
Economic situation. Slovakia performed fairly well during the transition from the
command economy to a market system. Stephen B. Heintz, assessing the results of
economic transformation of former socialist countries, places Slovakia into the group of
reform leaders (Table 2, Appendix):
Its economy looks quite bouncy: officially, it grew last year [1995] by
7.5%. Inflation is the region's lowest, at 6.2%. Foreign-exchange reserves
are up seven-fold since 1993, to $3.4 billion. The disappointment, for
Slovakia, is that such Asian-like figures have yet to attract Asian level of
foreign investment: only $733m has flowed in since 1990. 14
In spite of its good macroeconomic indicators, Slovakia might get into serious
economic difficulties. In October last year, an analysis of the Asian exchange rate crisis
found possible that Slovakia also might face similar turmoil because of its macroeconomic
imbalances:
Slovakia faces a current-account deficit of more than 10%ofGDP this year
[1997], of which only one-tenth will be covered by foreign direct
investment. The Slovak crown has remained pegged to a basket of
currencies, and, as a result, has lost competitiveness against the D-mark
and the Czech crown. The government budget deficit is almost 5% of
GDP. New measures which threaten to undermine the independence of the
central bank are not instilling confidence. 15
Another source of problems can be the structure of Slovakia's export relying
mainly on raw materials. At the same time, the import consists of high technology
products, and consumer goods. This imbalance suggests the lack of economic efficiency.
While the real wages, warned the IMF, have grown with a higher rate, about 10%, than
the productivity of the economy.
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The approximately 14% level of unemployment is also a major concern. The
unemployment can get even higher if the country takes on structural reforms.
Nevertheless, the government is hesitant to launch comprehensive reorganization, or
introduce the needed austerity program in a year of elections (1998).
16
Militaryforces. Military forces in Slovakia have two branches: Army, and Air and
Air Defense Forces. Since becoming an autonomous state, Slovakia has started the
reorganization of its military forces. The country has established civilian control over the
military, prepared a long-term development plan, and launched technical modernization.
Financial and economic capabilities will determine the size of the military forces in
Slovakia. At the same time, there is a requirement to preserve the credibility and
effectiveness of the military forces. The long-term plan is to reduce the military personnel
to 35,000 (about 5,000 officers from 10,000, increase its warrant officers from 3,400 to
10,000, and its 400 NCOs to 5,000, resulting in a professional force approaching 55% of
the armed forces) by the year 2000. 17
As part of the technical modernization process, the Slovak Army, first among the
former Warsaw Pact countries, accepted the NATO standard 155mm caliber for its
artillery system. In November of last year, Slovakia ordered eight Zuzana 155mm self-
HVG, 97/18, p. 24. (HVG is the Weekly World Economy, a Hungarian journal of economics.)
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propelled howitzers from a Slovak company. It was the largest contract offered for a
domestic contractor since the Slovak Army was formed. 18
The modernization of the Air Force has also begun. Currently, Slovakia maintains
24 of MIG-29 which were inherited from the previous Czechoslovak Army, and partly
obtained from Russia as compensation for debt. The country is planning to acquire
Kamov Ka-50 "Hokum" combat helicopters, and Yakovlev Yak- 130s light combat aircraft
from Russia also as part of debt-compensation.
19
One armament system, the SS-23 Spider theater ballistic missiles, has caused some
confusion around the Slovakian military intentions in the region. These missiles are
subject to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987, and have been withdrawn from
countries other than Slovakia and Bulgaria. These two states as non-signatories are not in
violation of the treaty. Even though Slovakia does not possess nuclear warheads, this
equipment has a sufficient destroying capability. On the other hand, are there any signs of
military threat justifying the holding of these missiles in service?
Assessing the defense capability of a country, requires the consideration of the
military industry, as well. Slovakia possesses a solid military industry inherited from the
former federation. As a matter of fact, Slovakia is an active participant in armament trade.
For instance, it produces T-72 main battle tanks, the above-mentioned howitzers, and
armored personnel vehicles BMP.
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Foreign policy. Hungary and Slovakia have signed a Treaty on Good
Neighborliness and Cooperation in March 1995. Hungary ratified the treaty soon after its
signature. Slovakia ratified the treaty in May 1996 after long disputes in the National
Council about it.
However, there are two issues of controversy between Hungary and Slovakia.
The first is the above-mentioned treatment of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The
ethnic issue became more serious since the assertion of the former Hungarian Prime
Minister Jozsef Antall about his intention to be the Premier Minister of 17 million
Hungarians including those living outside the country's borders.
The second debate is around a water dam at Gabcikovo. Originally, the plant was
to be built and operated in common by the countries. At an early stage of building works,
Hungary unilaterally terminated the agreement because of threatening ecological problems.
Slovakia with scarce mineral resources and being in a need for electricity built the dam on
Slovakian territory after distracting the border river Danube, and caused serious
environmental damages in the region. The case was brought to the International Court in
the Hague. The ruling of the Court was that the completed dam should not be
demolished. However, the necessary water supply for the damaged region had to be
ensured. The two countries are in search of an adequate solution but the agreement seems
to be far away.
Slovakia's relations with NATO are controversial. On one hand, the Slovak Army
maintains considerably good relations with the Alliance. The country's active
participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program is highly appreciated by the
24
Western governments. Slovakia showed its enthusiasm for membership in NATO by
submitting first among the CEE countries its discussion document. Also, the official
rhetoric mentions membership in NATO and other North Atlantic organizations as issues
of the highest priority. On the other hand, inclination from democratic principles and the
failed referendum in May 1997 about the membership in NATO make Slovakia's
commitment to the Western Alliance ambiguous:
Its becoming increasingly clear that Slovakia's relations with NATO are
two-sided. Although Slovakia has proved to be a reliable partner on
military front, it is moving further politically from the democratic standards
established by its Western partners. 20
At the same time, a worrisome development can be observed in Slovakia's
international relations: a closer relationship with Russia. A sign of it was mentioned in the
May 6, 1995 issue ofThe Economist:
The prime minister's enthusiasm for the West is also belied, in Slovakia's
foreign ministry, by a preponderance of diplomats involved in Russian
affaires compared with western ones. Slovakia has one man dealing with
NATO and six people in Brussels dealing with EU. Its embassy in
Moscow (which is admittedly embroiled in trying to recoup the $1.4 billion
that Russia owns Slovakia), has some 60 people. 21
Another example of the closing connections between Slovakia and Russia was
Slovakia's defense minister's visit to Russia at the end of 1996, where he pointedly
emphasized Slovakia's neutrality and ordered new communication equipment, and
helicopters. Slovakia was also working on establishing a free-trade zone with Russia
20
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because Peter Stanek, Meciar's economic advisor, saw the trade with Russia as a key for
Slovakia's prosperity.
22
A later development in Russian-Slovak relations is the signing of a military
agreement between Meciar and visiting Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin in




The shortest border Hungary shares is with her largest neighbor Ukraine to the
northeast of the country. Because of its large territory, population, economic possibilities,
Ukraine has to be considered a regional power. Because of this fact and the
difficulties around the Ukraine, the appraisal of the security situation around
Hungary could not be complete without evaluating Ukraine.
Ukraine faces a twofold challenge. On one hand, the country is in a deep
economic crisis which could be overcome through radical economic reforms that require
serious sacrifices from the population. On the other hand, Ukraine is an "artificial
creation"
24
which brings together several nationalities: Ukrainians, Russians, Jews,
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Belorusians, Moldovans, Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians, and Romanians. The failure of
economic reforms may well trigger a civil war with such a diverse diaspora. Because of
the large, 22%, Russian population, an internal upheaval could invoke Russian
involvement, too. This possibility constitutes a considerable threat for the security of the
CEE region.
Democratization, political stability. Ukraine is a relatively young state on the
map ofEurope which became independent after more then 300 years of Russian influence
in December 1991. The country has three internal issues threatening its political stability.
First, because of a short period of independent history, Ukraine is creating its own nation,
and looking for its own identity. The second thing is that similarly to other former Soviet
states, Ukraine has a large number of Russians in its population. The third issue is that
communists have the largest group in Ukrainian Parliament, Rada, which puts under
question, or makes difficult the continuation of the democratization and marketization
process.
The history of Ukraine has not allowed Ukrainians to develop a their national
identity. Periods of independent Ukrainian nation state were either long ago or too brief.
Ukraine was only a part of the Russian empire on the map. They do not have traditional
forces for national cohesiveness such as a single language or a strong church. Even
President Bush told Ukrainians to stay inside the Soviet Union for their own interest four
month before the declaration of independence. Ukraine seems to have its own face on
25
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the international arena but to mold national identity and cohesiveness will probably take a
few generations.
A lack of national identity is also connected with a diverse ethnic composition of
Ukraine. Only 73% of the population are Ukrainians. The second largest nationality is the
22% of Russians. 26 The remaining 5% are Jews, Belorusians, Moldovans, Bulgarians,
Hungarians, and Romanians. The biggest headache is caused by Russians. The way they
are treated largely determines the internal conditions in Ukraine and its relationship with
Moscow.
In March of this year, Ukraine held the second free elections for the first seven
years of its statehood. This was a mixed-type multiparty election in which representatives
had two ways to gain admittance into Rada. The first possibility was the single
representation of electoral regions and second, the voting for party lists. In spite of
several faults during the elections, the inauguration of the mixed system has been an
important step toward a modern multiparty democracy.
The outcome of the elections has not been joyful for the democratic forces.
Obtaining 123 seats from 450, the Ukrainian Communist Party (UCP) has now the largest
fraction in Rada. The composition of the government and Rada are different because the
government is formed by the President after the presidential elections. The UCP strongly
opposes the incumbent government; in fact, the UCP is a fierce adversary of the executive
branch. The UCP's program aims to abolish the current administration and the
76
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reestablishment of the basis of socialism. The UCP also is a ferocious opponent of market
reforms and privatization as well. In such circumstances, President Leonid Kuchma is
facing difficulties in continuing the reform process and is hesitating to introduce new
unpopular reform measures considering the approaching presidential elections in 1999. 27
Economic situation. Assuming his office, President Kuchma introduced
aggressive economic reforms with the liberalization of prices, trade and exchange rates
and the launch of a privatization program. Kuchma's comprehensive economic reforms
met considerable resistance from parliament, entrenched bureaucrats, and industrial
interests. Stephen B. Heintz evaluates Ukraine as "lager," and argues that Ukraine has not
reached its year of recovery by 1996 (Table 2, Appendix). The recovery year does not
seem to be approaching even now, and it may be even moving away with the
strengthening position ofUCP:
Ukraine's bottom line looks bad. Although it had some success in tackling
inflation, reducing the annual rate last year to 40% (and projecting 30% for
the end of 1997), the economy remains deep in recession-GDP contracted
by a frightening 10% last year and is widely expected to contract by a
further 2% this year. Exports have failed to pick up, leaving Ukraine last
year with a trade deficit of $4 billion. 28
Ukraine was the most important economic component of the former Soviet Union.
It has a large portion of fertile and arable land, and provided one-forth of Soviet
agricultural output. The country might easily be the breadbasket of Europe. The problem
27
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is the backwardness of agricultural production. In the rural areas, one can see more
horses than modern agricultural equipment and villagers live the lives of the "third-world
subsistence farmers."" The further development is impeded with a lag in privatization.
Private plots are less then 10% of all agricultural lands. 30
Ukraine has inherited a diverse heavy industry from the former USSR which
supplied equipment and raw materials to industrial and mining sites of other regions. The
large industrial complexes are impeded now by lack of demand for their products. Russia
would need these products but cannot pay for them. On the other hand, these goods are
not competitive and are not demanded in the western part of Europe. In order to change
this situation, Ukraine has to carry out comprehensive structural reforms which are
hindered by influence of different interest groups and interests of the Russian part of the
population managing and working for the huge state companies. The other obstacle is, of
course, the opposition from the side ofthe UCP with its stronger position in Rada.
Though, the CIA's country fact book finds possible the occurrence of real GDP
growth in 199831 if President Kuchma succeeds in implementing aggressive market
reforms, and if he current internal political situation does not offer a real hope for a close
breakthrough.
29
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Military forces. After Russia, Ukraine has the largest, well-equipped military in
the CEE region (Table 3, Appendix). Ukraine acceded to nuclear power status through
the separation from the Soviet Union, and assumed respectable strategic forces with a
large inventory of intercontinental ballistic missiles (176 missiles, and about 2,400 tactical
warheads3 ) and bombardiers. Its military force is also backed up by a large and strong
military-industrial complex inherited from the former USSR, too. The country is the
producer of the T-84 "super tank," military transport helicopters, planes possesses
advanced space technology, and the largest rocket-producing factory in the world. 33
Ukraine's military doctrine sees international political crises as the main military
threat for the country. The international political conflict can lead to economic, territorial,
inter-ethnic, and religious conflicts. These conflicts may result in an aggressive ". . .design
upon Ukraine by one state or a coalition of states in the form of politico-economic
pressure, territorial demands, anti-Ukrainian propaganda and the inciting of ethnic
animosity."
34
Ukraine has prepared the "State Program of Building and Developing the Armed
Forces of Ukraine, 1995-2010." This plan provisions the reduction of personnel from
450,000 to 220,000 by the end of the decade. The project also aims to shift to the corps-
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brigade structure of the new armed forces backed by a main force of mechanized and tank
brigades, with a priority given to infantry. As a result, Ukraine's armed forces would be
smaller, leaner, more mobile, and better equipped. The plan has a conception for
development of the Ukrainian Navy, too. Smaller military forces targeted by the Program
would also give some relief for the economy. 35
The plan to have a smaller military force have prompted strong nationalist
opposition. They consider at least a 450,000 man strong military as a guarantee of
Ukraine's security. The victory of communists forces at the last elections makes
suspicious the future commitment of Ukraine to carry out the reorganization Program of
the armed forces.
However, there is a development inspiring confidence for not just the CEE region
but the whole world. After a longstanding debate, Ukraine agreed to refrain from its
nuclear power status. On June 1-2, 1996 the last former Soviet nuclear weapons were
removed from the Ukraine and are sent to Russia. The removing of tactical nuclear arms
by May 1992, 176 SS-18 and SS-22 ballistic missiles with 1,240 nuclear warheads, and 43
Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers with 372 nuclear-armed cruise missiles were repatriated
from Ukraine to Russia.
Foreign policy. Since its independence, Ukraine has opted for a non-aligned
status and neutrality in order not to alienate Russia. According to Ukraine's perception,
35
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the creation of a comprehensive universal or pan-European security system is the proper
approach to provide security in contemporary Europe.
37
Arranging controversial issues,
maintaining good relations with neighbors are the key issues for establishing a security
system.
Ukraine has resolved border issues and other debates with all of its neighbors and
has signed treaties on good neighborhood and cooperation. With Hungary, Ukraine did
not even have any disputes. The treatment of Hungarian minorities in Ukraine is cited as
an example by the Hungarian officials. The territorial issue between Ukraine and Romania
was settled on the eve ofNATO's Madrid Summit for Romania's intention to join NATO.
The biggest debate Ukraine has with Russia is on issues of nuclear power status of
Ukraine, about the split of the Black Sea Fleet, and the sovereignty of the Crimea. After a
long period of debates, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma signed on May 30, 1997 the
Treaty on Friendship, Corporation and Partnership between Russia and the Ukraine.
However, the Russian-Ukrainian relationship has remained burdened with the large
Russian diaspora because nearly half of Russians living abroad inhabit the Ukraine. Kiev
has a fear of a threat of a possible military intervention from Russia on behalf of their
compatriots. On the other hand, Ukraine needs close relations with Russia because of the
historically tight economic connections. Ukraine's goals in its relations with Russia are
expressed in the "Program of the Activity of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers":
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The Program clearly outlines that Ukraine will continue to reject political
or military integration with the CIS while actively co-operating within the
economic sphere. Consequently, Ukraine has joined the CIS Inter-State
Economic Committee but rejected membership of the Customs Union and
Payments Union, and has remained an associate member of the Economic
Union. 39
Finally, Ukraine seems to approach the West and NATO. Leaders in Kiev know
that neutrality is not an alternative for the Ukraine for many reasons. However, in the
short term, Ukraine does not seek membership in NATO because it needs time to
overcome the economic and energy crises as well as undertake the nation- and state-
building. One sign of upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine relations is the "Charter for a
Distinctive Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine" signed on the Madrid Summit in
June 1997. The aim of the Charter is to reaffirm NATO's support for Ukraine's
sovereignty and independence, as well as to deepen the cooperation between the two
parties.
A recent development in Ukraine's foreign policy is the formation of a new group
within the CIS with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova known by the acronym GUAM
which has defined its priorities at a meeting of the foreign ministers in Strasbourg last
October:
[T]he fight against separatism and regional conflicts; development of the
Eurasian and Transcaucasus corridors; and integration into Euro-Atlantic
and Atlantic structures. 40
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Officially, GUAM is not aimed against Russia, but the mere fact of its
establishment shows the will of these four nations to avoid a Russian influence. The Baku
Panorama also suggests that the real goal of the group is to restrain Russia's urge towards




Romania is the southeastern neighbor of Hungary. The country is bigger by all its
parameters than Hungary. The majority of Hungarians living in a foreign country, about
1.6m, live in Romania. Romania has rich stocks of mineral resources and possesses the
ability to develop a strong prosperous economy. The military forces of Romania are well
equipped and well trained. The country is engaged in a modernization and reorganization
project of its armed forces.
Democratic institutions are present in Romania. However, serious economic
difficulties trigger political instability in the country. In a worst case, economic troubles
may result in an undesirable political outcome: the strengthening nationalism and the
blaming of foreign countries for their problems. These considerations make Romania an
important stakeholder in Hungary's security.
Democratization, political stability. The left-nationalist, ex-government of




This situation has been changed by now. Except for minor troubles, Romania has
established a working democracy under its next government of President Emil
Constantinescu (Table 4, Appendix). The defeat of the ex-communist government and the
inauguration of the center-right coalition (Peasants, Petre Roman's Democratic Party, the
ethnically-based Hungarian Party, and the Democratic Convention umbrella organization)
in November of 1996 improved the prospects of democracy in Romania:
Romania's neo-communist regime was removed from power last
November in freely contested elections. Violence against ethnic
Hungarians in Romania, widely predicted did not happen; old rivals
Hungary and Romania are now allies; and ethnic Hungarians are members
ofRomania's ruling coalition.
42
However, the new government's ethnic policy has seen some trouble. The
Romanian parliament voted against the Hungarian's new education rights thus, forbidding
them to use Hungarian-speaking faculties in universities. In response, the Hungarian
Democratic Federation for Romania threatened to leave the coalition. President Emil
Constantinescu undertook to override the parliament's decision. The rights of Hungarians
face strong local opposition, too. For instance, Georghe Funar, mayor of Cluj, changed
the historic street-names in the city and also had council workers steal the Hungarian flag
from the newly opened consulate.
Besides the ethnic disputes, the political situation in Romania is unstable because
of the serious economic difficulties. Victor Ciorbea, the Prime Minister, falling short to
42
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carry out his economic reforms, was forced to resign at the beginning of April this year.
The former coalition formed a new government by the end of April but it may face a really
hard time:
[T]he government looks as messy as ever. The Social Democrats want
tough reforms; the ethnic Hungarian party wants a better deal for ethnic
Hungarians; and the Christian Democrats want to hand back land and
property to the pre-communist owners.
43
Before the inauguration of the new government, the political situation in Romania
was rather ambiguous since the ruling forces in the parliament have remained of the same
parties. The evaluation by the Foreign Report of Jane's Defense Information Group is
disturbing:
[I]t is almost impossible to see how the current impasse can be resolved.
The government does not command a majority in parliament, but dares not
risk another election, mainly because the opposition is composed of
communists, ex-communists and blatantly fascist parties, and these are
themselves deeply divide. At the very best, therefore, fresh elections either
recreate the current fractured parliament, or bring to power some of the
least lovable politicians Eastern Europe ever conceived. 44
On top of it all, Romanians are deeply disappointed by being left out of the first
round ofNATO enlargement. The government has been focused on Romania's accession
to NATO. Also, the Romanian public strongly favored NATO membership. According to
an opinion poll organized in late spring, 1997, 76% of the national sample favored
43
"Romania 's Last Chance."Foreign Report Jane's Information Group Limited, April 23, 1998.
44
"Romania 's Golden Opportunity" Foreign Report Jane's Information Group Limited, April 23, 1998.
37
Romania's joining NATO. 45 Analyzing the Madrid decision, Daniel N. Nelson and
Thomas S. Szayna in one of the RAND Corporation's papers discussed the Romanian
case:
Romania's exclusion from the first group of invitees will have
consequences. Although Foreign Minister Severin and others in spring,
1997 visits to Washington, D.C. made it clear at Bucharest will not
abandon its focus on NATO because no offer for membership came from
Madrid, he and others in the Constantinescu government expect political
fallout.
46
Economic situation. However, Stephen B. Heintz places Romania into the group
of "comers." (Table 2, Appendix) in his analysis, the Romanian economy faces some
substantial crises. The economy is burdened with worrisome macroeconomic indicators.
The transformation to the free market goes hesitantly. The share of the private sector in
GDP is one of the lowest among transition countries. The EU evaluation (Table 2,
Appendix) also finds that the Romanian economy would have had a hard time to compete
with Western firms in case of a recent accession ofRomania to EU.
The results of the Romanian economy for 1997 have been very poor. The yearly
inflation reached a three-digit level, about 150 to 160%. The GDP is estimated to
decrease to 5-6% for 1997. The exchange rate of the Romanian currency quickly
increases since the beginning of this year.47
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The privatization in Romania is lagging behind in comparison to the other
countries of the former socialist lager. By the end of 1997, less than the half of the state
owned companies went to the private sector. 48 Romania has also failed to reorganize its
economic structure. Several industrial giants owned by the state are to be restructured or
closed. The continuation of privatization, and the restructuring of the industry threatens
with a substantial increase of the surprisingly low, officially around 7% in last year49
,
unemployment level.
In addition, the Romanian economy suffers several other problems. The country is
short on managers acquainted with acquainted with market practices. The economy needs
capital to carry out the modernization and restructuring of companies. Finally, the
economic insufficiencies provide a very low income level for the population. This results
in a decrease of consumption which holds back economic development.
Even though, the EU evaluation mentions significant improvement in establishing
market economy in Romania, the country has a long way to go. An analysis of the
prospects of the new government established in April 1998 shows that although Romania
has an opportunity to reform its economy it may face further economic difficulties:
Romania has a "golden opportunity" to carry out structural economic
reforms and eventually join the European Union. If Romania is given a
decisive role, there is still hope. By carrying on as it is, Romania is heading
straight for the poorhouse. 5
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Military forces. Romania has larger and better equipped military forces than
Hungary (Table 3, Appendix). However, as a majority of the countries, Romania has also
started to reform and decrease its army. The reform process has been divided into two
separate phases. The first period between 1990 and 1992 was devoted to depolitization
and the establishment of civil control over the military. The second phase focuses on the
reorganization and modernization of the military forces. 51
During the reorganization project called "Armed Forces 2000," Romania has
planned to change the division-regiment type structure of its army into the traditional
NATO brigade-battalion formations. Another feature of this reform is the plan to increase
the number of professional inside the military and to have half professionals and half
conscripts by the end of the project. 52 In January 1998, Romania announced its intention
to decrease its military personnel from the recent 200,000 plus to a strength of 140,000 in
order to free funds for modernization.
Concerning armament, Romania has finished the reduction of its military
equipment as determined by the CFE Treaty. Romania has also started technical
modernization. Together with Turkey, it has a project to develop and produce the RN-94
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6x6 amphibious armored personnel carrier.
54
Romania's air force possesses MIG-29s, the
first ofwhich were received already in 1990. At the same time, the Romanian Aerostar
with the Israeli Elbit have been working on upgrading 100 of Romania's aging 200 MIG-
21 fighter aircraft to NATO standards. 56 Bucharest wants to have Western type aircraft,
too. Last year, it announced plans to acquire up to 12 used US fighters, and awarded a
contract to deliver 96 AH-1RO Cobra helicopters produced by the Brassov, Romania,
facility of the American Bell and Textron companies. Romania, first among the former
Warsaw Pact members, has already received four excess USAF C-130s, and requires eight
or nine more.
57
The intention is to use them for peacekeeping purposes and to quickly
transport troops into hot regions.
Romania has an effective armament industry, too. The industry of the country is
able to provide 85% of its military needs during the Warsaw Pact time. Romania has
committed itself to rebuilt its military industry to provide for its own, and export needs:
Now the government is looking for new areas of co-operation. It has
formed a special military industrial group in the state sector hat will exploit
Romania's low labor and plant cost in the AFV [armored fighting vehicles],
artillery, and missile sectors. It will also have an overhaul responsibility for
warship and other naval programs, both domestic and export. 59
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Foreign policy. Romania has pursued a good neighbor policy particularly since
the establishment of its new government in 1996. The other feature of Romania's external
policy is the country's yearn for accession into NATO and the European Union.
The historical antagonism between Romania and Hungary in connection with
Hungarian minorities has vanished. The two countries have signed a friendship treaty on
borders and minority rights in 1996. From the Romanian side, the treaty was signed by
President Ion Iliescu before leaving his office. The treaty has been ratified by both
countries and sufficiently improved the relationship between the two states for the sake of
accession into NATO.
Furthermore, Romania has signed and ratified a friendship treaty with the Ukraine
proclaiming the current borders between the two countries to be inviolable. Thus,
Romania has met one of the requirements, not to have border disputes with neighbors, of
both NATO and EU accession. 60
Romania sees its future being ensured through membership in NATO and the EU.
Therefore, the country exerts any possible effort to achieve this goal. Romania was the
first nation to sign the NATO's PfP program, considering it as a first step toward NATO
membership. Soon after this act, Romania offered troops for participation in
peacekeeping operations.61 Romania has been very active in PfP exercises, education, and
Foreign Report Jane's Information Group Limited, May 15, 1997.
"Romania First to Join NATO 'Partnership, " Jane's Defence Weekly, February 5, 1994, p. 6.
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other programs. The search for possible ways of military cooperation and cooperation in
defense industries indicate more signs ofRomania's commitment to NATO membership.
4. Serbia and Montenegro
Serbia and Montenegro is a country bordering with Hungary from south. The
geographical size and population of Serbia and Montenegro is comparable to that of
Hungary. The country has been formed in the stormy demise of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed itself the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. However, the name and the legitimacy of the formation are somehow
controversial because the successor countries could not agree about the division of the
formally common federal assets and the continuity of rights and liabilities of the
predecessor Yugoslavia. Therefore, the USA has not recognized the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and its rights for succession of the former state.
Serbia and Montenegro as well as the Balkans are "hot spots" on the map of
Europe considering the bloody war and national antagonism of the beginning of 1990s.
The region is alarming even after the more than two years since the Dayton settlement.
The revival of the long-standing antagonism between Serbs and Albanians in Serbian
Kosovo projects the possibility of a new hostility and the danger of recourse to military
clashes. The internal hostility may than well escalate into the neighboring countries:
Albania, Montenegro, and possibly to Bulgaria, and Greece as well. Such a turn of events
composes a high risk for the entire Europe and Hungary in particular. A military conflict
would induce a new wave of refugees toward the neighboring countries, and Western
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Europe, would threaten with a spill over of fighting to the territory of neighbors, and
would raise serious concerns in Hungary about the fate of Hungarian minority living in
Vojvodina (part of Serbia and Montenegro).
Democratization, political stability. The democracy and political stability in
Serbia and Montenegro is threatened by two developments. First is the autocratic political
power and extremists parties and the second connected with ethnic tensions between
Serbs and Albanians.
Serbia and Montenegro compose a federation, and has two state presidents, and a
president of the federation. Slobodan Milosevic was the President of Serbia since 1990
and built up a strong position for himself According to the Serbian Constitution, one can
have no more than two terms as president of Serbia. Milosevic, after his second term, has
obtained the presidency of the federation last year, and started to strengthen the influence
ofthe formerly weak position. A more worrisome development is the strengthening of the
radical political forces which were seen during the presidential election in Serbia in 1997:
Suddenly Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslavia's authoritarian president and
once the Balkans' chief troublemaker, looks almost lovable— because an
even nastier man has come within a whisker of becoming president of
Serbia, the bigger of republics that make up what is left of Yugoslavia.
The near-winner was Vojislav Seselj, an even more virulent nationalist,
whose first act, as he celebrated his lead in the vote count over Zoran Lilic,
the (ex-communist) Socialist candidate picked as a would-be stooge by Mr.
Milosevic, was to cut a cake in the shape of"Greater Serbia."62
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'Serbia 's Grasping Strongman, " The Economist October 11, 1997, p. 56.
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Even though Vojislav Seselj did not win the presidency at the second round of
elections, Milosevic offered and gave him a deputy prime minister post, one of the five, in
the Serbia's government this year. Now, Seselj 's ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party
has 15 of 36 posts in the cabinet. Seselj, "an intelligent brute," is widely feared in Kosovo
and Montenegro because he helped— with the Milosevic's approval — the organization
of bloody ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs in the war of early 1990s.
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Thus, we have arrived to the ethnic tensions in Kosovo, a territory with 90%
Albanians in its population. Ethnic complications have arisen from Kosovo's ambitions
for autonomy. The formerly Autonomic Territory of Kosovo in the old Yugoslavia has
become an integrated part of Serbia in 1990 in order to suppress the aspirations of the
Albanian majority for independence. The "reintegration" of Kosovo into Serbia was
disastrous for the Albanians. Thousands of them lost their jobs, their schools and
universities were closed and all of the political power went over the hands of the 10%
Serbs. However, the Albanians have never given up their ambitions and they have
maintained their own administration in parallel with the official Serbian authorities. By
now, the situation became a real stalemate. The Albanians have their own working
administration, never acknowledged as legitimate by Serbia; the Serbs have the police and
the armed forces under their rule. Even the assimilation of Albanians is impossible
because of their large number, and lingual and religious differences exist between the two
nationalities. As far as the recent situation, Kosovo can easily become a second Bosnia
Ibid.
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with a high possibility of involving the neighboring countries, all of which have more or
less Albanian population.
64
Military clashes of the last month have become more frequent,
signaling the operation of the Kosovo Liberation Army.
Economic situation. As it can be imagined after a four-year war, and imposed by
the international community sanctions, the economy of Serbia and Montenegro is
disastrous:
As for the economy, it is now in a worse state than it was under sanctions.
After the Dayton accord ended the war in Bosnia last November, many
Serbs expected a quick recovery. But industrial output in July, though
15% higher than in July 1995, was still 41% below that of July 1991.
Average salaries stand at DM185 ($125) a month and living standards are
lower than a year ago. Serbia will pay the price ofwar for fully a decade to
65
come.
Two obstacles make the economic recovery more difficult. In 1996, the UN had
not ceased the economic embargo, but just suspended it, and it could be easily reimposed
if necessary. It prevents the majority of investors to bring capital into the country. At the
same time, Serbia and Montenegro is separated with an "outer wall" from the international
financial institution — IMF, EBRD — because of electoral fraud. Yet, the wall will
probably remain until a satisfactory arrangement of the Albanian question. On the other
hand, Mr Milosevic and his "team" do not focus on economic issues. Calling it
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privatization, Milosevic sells large parts of companies to foreign entities to maintain his
political image giving social benefits or paying pensions from the revenues. 66
Military forces. Serbia and Montenegro have acquired practically the entire
military forces of the Former Yugoslavia. Although, it is difficult to attain reliable data
about the real holdings, according to the numbers published, the military forces are not
sufficiently stronger than the Hungarian Armed Force (Table 3, Appendix). The single
most significant factor that really favors the Yugoslavian National Army (YNA) is the
fighting experience gained during the recent war.
A promising development occurred in the behavior of army personnel. Last year,
the army refused to take to the streets again to support Milosevic, as it did six years ago in
confrontation with opposition groups. Another extremist threatened the Government with
a possible military coup also was cooled down by senior military leaders. The reason for
turning away from the ruling Socialist Party may well be the lack of funds. 67 For instance,
the defense budget appropriated for 1998 is 67.5% of that requested, and 72% of that will
be spent for personnel expenses. 68
Because of insufficient funding the modernization of the obsolete military
equipment of YNA has not started as yet. Claiming raw materials for its industry,
Yugoslavia refused to receive Russian MIG-29s in a weapon-for-debt deal in 1996.
66,,.,
Ibid.
"The JA Stays out ofthe Troubled Serb Politics, " Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1, 1997, p. 3.
"Yugoslav Budget is Approved, " Jane's Defence Weekly , January 14, 1998, p. 13.
47
However, Yugoslavia expressed its interest for acquiring MI-24 attack helicopters and
Tunguska self-propelled air-defense system. A real sphere of interest in the Russia-
Yugoslavia military-technical cooperation is the modernization of current equipment
owned by YNA:
It is [...] Yugoslavia which represents a particularly attractive market for
the Russians and their military upgrades. Following the signing of the 1997
agreement on military-technical co-operation, Yugoslav Defence Minister
Pavle Bulatovic explained the rationale behind the agreement pointing out
that the existing Yugoslav weaponry, mainly ex-Soviet stock, needs to be
"serviced and overhauled."
Foreign policy. Serbia and Montenegro have several issues of debate with the
countries once comprising the old Yugoslavia. For one thing, they cannot reach an
agreement about the division of the former federation's assets. Serbia feels responsibility
for its brothers living outside of its borders. A long-lasting issue is with Croatia about the
Prevlaka Peninsula in southern Croatia because it controls the entrance to Kotor Bay in
Montenegro.
70
The Republic of Yugoslavia has traditionally had good relations with Russia.
Russia helped Serbs during the Bosnian crisis protesting against bombing of Serb
territories by NATO forces, or by trying to prevent or the easing economic sanctions by
69
"Russia Chases Fewer Clients as Former Satellites Look West" Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1,
1998, p. 12.
Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/sr.html.
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the international community. The two countries have signed a military accord in 1995
with a condition that the agreement would not come into effect until the trade sanctions
were lifted.
71
However, the connections with western countries are not as good as with Russia.
The reason is, of course, the strict economic embargo imposed by UN in 1992 that was
just suspended, not lifted, after the Dayton agreement. There has remained an "outer
wall" which separates Serbia and Montenegro from the international financial institutions.
For Milosevic, the ceasing of sanctions, and reintegration into the world economic system
might even appear undesirable. It is so because the economy of the country is run mainly




In spite of its weakness now, Russia is a big power of Europe with its huge size,
richness in minerals and raw materials, and because of its largest military force in Europe.
Russia is never as strong, or never as weak as it seems to be. It is also not the case that
the small Hungary could pursue a policy from the position of power against Russia.
Nevertheless, we cannot omit Russia from the analysis of the security situation ofHungary
for at least two reasons. First, even a weak Russia can exercise a considerable influence
"Russia, Yugoslavia Sign Military Accord, " Jane's Defence Weekly, March 18, 1995, p. 8.
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on Europe, and cause hard or good times for the world, and with Hungary part of it as
well. Second, even a small power, like Hungary can maintain a policy of influencing the
behavior of strong countries.
Russia today is a country with an ill-suited economy but with a desire to establish a
working market economy. Its military is breaking up, too. Losing its former influence in
the region, Russia is looking for a new identity with a dream to gain back its earlier
superpower position. Russia is also engaged in its perceived mission to ensure the rights
of the 25 millions of Russian people who remained in neighboring countries after the
demise of the former Soviet Union. Russia currently is a huge country with huge troubles.
Democratization, political stability. Because of their character, Russian peoples
need, and have always needed, a strong leader whom they can follow. Historically, this
leader was the tsar, then came Lenin and Stalin, and the other first secretaries of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the presidential system with extended
power of the president seems to be well suited for the country. The President of Russian
Federation is elected by popular vote for a four-year term. The President has the right to
appoint the premier minister and the deputies with the approval of the State Duma, the
lower house of the Russian parliament.
The power of the President is well displayed in the last change of the government.
Unsatisfied with the development of economic reforms, Boris Yeltsin dissolved the
incumbent government led by Viktor Chernomyrdin in March 1998. When the President
named his new candidate for heading the government, he also warned the Duma that if it
would fail to approve the nomination, the President was going to dissolve the Duma, too.
50
Anyhow, the political stability of Russia can be endangered. President Yeltsin has
a strong pro-reform commitment while the largest fraction in the parliament is formed by
the anti-market Communists Party of the Russian Federation. The head of the communist
party, Gennadiy Zyuganov was the opponent of Boris Yeltsin at the last presidential
elections in 1996 and gathered 40% of the popular votes (Yeltsin had 54%). Another
considerable opponent of Yeltsin in the Duma is the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic
Party of Russia (LDP) headed by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Though the Liberal Party has
only 11% of the seats in the recent Duma, it gained 24% of the popular votes in the
parliamentary elections ofDecember 1993. And public dissatisfaction is growing:
Angered by the extent of mafia power coupled with government corruption
and by government's inability to regulate the present economic system,
many Russians are looking at the more extreme political parties, deserting
the political center.
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Although Zhirinovskiy does not have significant political appeal, and may not
present a definite threat to Yeltsin, the deteriorating public mood and Zhirinovskiy' s ultra-
extremists ideas are worth considering seriously:
Zhirinovskiy' s neofascist rhetoric finds an audience in those frustrated by
the recent decline in Russia's power. He claims outlandish territorial goals
if elected. The LDP has an aggressive foreign policy agenda, pledging to
reunite Russians in the "near abroad" (a common Russian term for the
former Soviet Republics) by forcefully resurrecting the Soviet Union. LDP
domestic policy is no less alarming. The LDP is both overly racist and anti-
73
Riggs M.G., The Russian Mafia and the Criminalization of the Reform Process, The International
Relations Journal, Winter 1997, published by the San Francisco State University, p. 113.
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Semitic. Zhirinovskiy asserts, "I may have to shoot one hundred thousand
people, but the other three hundred million will live peacefully. I have the
right to shoot these hundred thousand."
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It does not mean that the reform process could be turned back. Anyway it is
looked at, the future division of internal political power in Russia is uncertain, and the next
elections can cause undesirable consequences and difficulties for the West. A possible
communist triumph would further slow down the transition and a growing ultranationalist
influence would make Russia's foreign policy aggressive, especially in the "near abroad."
Economic situation, Russia started the transformation from socialist planning to
the free market. Since then the privatization passed over 70% in the industry but lagged
far behind in the agrarian sector. However, Russia did not reach its recovery year by 1996
according to Stephen B. Heintz (Table 2, Appendix). The estimates of economic
development in Russia in 1996 showed further decline in both the GDP and industrial
output by 6%, and 5% respectively.
Two successes can be mentioned. First, the results of the fight against inflation
which fell from 131% in 1995 to 22% in 1996. The second thing is a slight improvement




The economic date has been found in the fact book of the Central Intelligence Agency,
http ://www .odci .gov/cia/publications/factbook/rs .html
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several years according to Russian statistical records, for the last several years. However,
this improvement was backed up with financial aid given by the West to help Yeltsin's
reelection.
Russia has failed to address several other critical issues. The restructuring of the
social welfare system has not happened. The implementation of a comprehensive taxation
system
76
was also missed, while tax collection felt short in comparison to what was
budgeted. The restructuring of the industry was behind schedule, too. The establishment
of new working places went slowly because of a lack of capital and a very low level of
foreign investment. In addition, Russia has a never before seen level ofunemployment:
Unemployment in Russia, traditionally low during Soviet times, has
skyrocketed since the reform process began. Increased unemployment is
normal in reforming economies, but in Russia it is acute and may worsen.
A report by the International Labor Organization concluded in January
1997 that unemployment in Russia has been chronically underestimated and
is well over 10% [the officially recognized level].
After all, it is little wonder that Yeltsin changed his government as the general
public is discontented. The economic difficulties may well invoke a nostalgia for the best
times of the socialism and the strengthening of nationalism.
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According to the recent taxation system, Russian companies, and entrepreneurs pay income taxes based
on the revenues instead of the real profit they earned.
77
Riggs M.G., The Russian Mafia and the Criminalization ofthe Reform Process, The International
Relations Journal, Winter 1997, published by the San Francisco State University, p. 108.
53
Military forces. In November 1992, the Security Council of the Russian
Federation approved the new Military Doctrine . Although the new doctrine departures
from the old Soviet one, it has new elements.
According to the document, Russia does not identify any state as an adversary, and
every nation which does not harm Russian interests and complies with the UN Charter is
regarded as partner. The basic approach to security is cooperation with partners in
maintaining peace and in preventing war and armed conflicts. The document emphasizes
nonmilitary means of ensuring security, such as confidence building measures in military
matters, information-exchange about armed forces, as well as coordination of military
doctrines with allies and partners. Mutual military cooperation is to be maintained
especially with members of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), and countries of
CEE.
The possibility of a large scale military conflict or a nuclear war is perceived to be
diminished but some sources of military conflicts still prevail. The origins of conflicts are
social, political, economic, religious, national, and ethnic rivalries. Military threats can
appear in the form of territorial claims, the mistreatment of Russian minorities living
outside of the Russian homeland, and the "expansion of military blocs and alliances to the
detriment ofthe interest of military security ofRussia."79
78 An analysis of Russia's new Military Doctrine appeared in The Economist Russia 's Military Doctrine:
Addressing New Security Requirements, January 1, 1994, p. 5
Ibid.
54
A new task of the Russian military forces is peacekeeping as mandated by the UN
Security Council. Besides the national or collective self-defense, the military force can be
used to cease military conflicts in order to safeguard Russia's vital interest.
Even if military means are just the last resorts in providing for security, a country
needs armed forces which are well prepared, disciplined, and accepts civilian control over
themselves. The German foreign office reported that "Russian armed forces are in
crisis."
80 The conclusion ofthe foreign office reinforces the report ofReuters:
The army has long ceased to be a guarantee against external threats. The
present state of the Russian Army can only be described as a catastrophe of
the armed forces which is growing into a national catastrophe. Within the
next three years the Army, if it is not reformed, will disappear as such, or it
will break into armed groups which makes ends meet through selling arms
or robberies, or there could be a military coup which could grow into
dictatorship or civil war.
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The Russian military budget has substantially decreased for the period 1992 to
1996 from $171 billion to $76 billion in constant 1995 dollars. The training of the forces
is inadequate. For instance, in 1994 only 30% of all planned exercises were completed,
60% of which were only command post exercises without forces involved. The biggest
portion of the force is not combat ready. Fifty one land force divisions of 81, or 14
brigades of 25 are not in a state of operational readiness. The majority of fighters
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and bombers Russia received from the former Soviet Union are now stored or have been
destroyed. The German study concludes, "Russia's power projection capability must be
considered insufficient to operate outside the former Soviet Union."82
Because of economic difficulties, Russia has decided to reorganize and
substantially cut its military forces. The reform process is planned to have two phases. In
the first phase from 1997 to 2002, the personnel are to be cut down to 1.2 million. About
200,000 officers, and about 300,000 civil servants will leave the military. The other
feature of the reform is that the branch of military forces is to be decreased from the
former five to three. By now, the Troops of Air Defense Forces has been integrated into
the Air and Space Forces. During the second phase of reorganization, the Strategic
Rocket Forces will be eliminated as an independent service, leaving the Russian military
with three branches: Air and Space Forces, Army, and the Navy. 83
Modernizing its forces, Russia has finished the development and testing of the SS-
27 (Topol-M) intercontinental ballistic missile last year. The new missiles with 10,500 km
range are to form the nucleus of Russia's future nuclear deterrence. The new missile will
be deployed with a single warhead to satisfy the requirements of the Russian-US Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaties. In connection with the missiles, Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev
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Weekly , April 8, 1998, p. 30.
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stated that Russia's intention is to retain the nuclear power status in the 21st century for
the sake of global strategic stability.
84
Foreign policy. Nothing is certain in Russia's foreign policy. It pursues a
reclaimation of its superpower position which is hard to achieve without solid economic
background. Russia also seeks to gain back its influence over the countries of the former
Soviet Union and even countries of Central Europe. Moscow disapproves of the
enlargement of NATO with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. On the other
hand, it desires closer connection with the European Union and the entanglement into the
world economic system through membership in World Trade Organization. Russia is also
gaining participation in the G7 by its widening to the G8. For the purpose of this study,
we will look at Russia's "near abroad," and Central European relations, and the
development of the NATO-Russia affairs.
Noted by one Russian concept to gain back its former status is to ensure that the
former Soviet republics and to some extent Eastern Europe are recognized as Russia's
sphere of influence. Part of this strategy is the perceived privilege of Russia to defend
ethnic Russians no matter where they live. Russia considers the former members of the
Soviet Union as "near abroad" and takes the responsibility of assuring the security of that
region. In order to reestablish its influence, there was the foundation of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) under Russian initiative. The problem for
Russia is that except for Belarus, no country seems to have enthusiasm for the new
84
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formation. Recognizing the resistance of the countries under consideration, Russia has
changed its approach by erasing the term "near abroad" from its official vocabulary. This
minor change does not signal a real shift in Russia's policy. The Economist dispenses with
the idea in one of its articles:
Russia has suddenly noticed that the CIS, at the best of times a rickety
creation bringing together all the countries of the old Soviet Union save for
the Baltic states, is in danger of failing apart entirely. Yet it still offers the
best hope Russia has of keeping and even spreading its diplomatic and
economic interest beyond its borders.
The relationship between Russia and NATO has been controversial. Although
both sides assert that they do not consider each other adversaries any longer, the
establishment and maintenance of close cooperation are hardly effective processes. Russia
joined the NATO Partnership for Peace for Program after some conflicts about the
alliance program and claims for "special protocol" reflecting Russia's superpower status.
Finally, the parties concluded with an "enhanced dialogue" agreement which included such
issues as nuclear disarmament, the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, dealing with crises in Europe, and preparation for peacekeeping missions. 87
However, the cooperation seems to work haltingly. A senior NATO official evaluated it
as "extremely disappointing."
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Naturally, the most debatable question for the NATO-Russia relations is the
enlargement of the alliance. Russia has considered the enlargement as a "... confidence
destroying instead of a confidence-building measure," and answered to it by delaying a
number of arms control agreements. 89 After long debates, the way to NATO enlargement
was opened by concluding the Founding Act on Mutual Relations in May 1997. The Act
created a new institution — the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council — for the
consultation between NATO and Russia, which was intended to give Russia a voice, but
not a veto, in NATO affairs, and also established a Russian mission at the Alliance. 90
Though some people are skeptical about the deal, the agreement may open a new period
in a continuing, but difficult relationship. Anyhow, the skepticism is real if we consider
the vocal opposition in the Duma, or Russia's strong opposition to a possible enlargement
ofNATO with the Baltic states.
6. Possible Future Scenarios
Table 1 summarizes the results from the overview of the external stakeholders in
Hungary's security. Analyzing the overall picture, four different scenarios could be
identified as possible future developments in the region's security content.
The first, "an era of peaceful cooperation and development," is an optimistic one.
Under this assumption, all of the countries obey the basic rules of international relations,
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determination. States and different groups within states refrain from the use of force to
settle their disputes. This outcome is based on the recognition by countries of their best
interest for maintaining mutually advantageous cooperation on several fields. A well-
established security cooperation built on confidence and a interdependence among nations
is an essential requirement to achieve such a status. For that, nations have to change their
behavior. For instance, Russia has to abandon its hegemonic aspiration and Serbs are to
allow autonomy to Albanians in Kosovo. Though this notion is a highly optimistic and a
highly improbable one at least in the short run, nation-states do not have a better
alternative than to work for a stable peace that makes it possible to achieve prosperity and
a high standard of living in the long run.
The second option is the "rolling down of a new iron curtain." This scenario
assumes an extended Russian influence over several former Soviet republics, Slovakia,
Romania, and Serbia. The Russian sphere of influence may also be over other territories
and countries such as the Bosnian Serb Republic, Serb Krajina, and even Bulgaria.
However, this option might be an unstable one. There is not a real community of interest
nor a common binding ideology. Slovakia may become part of this system because it
would not be criticized for its undemocratic practices. Romania would agree on co-
operation for its feeling of abandonment by NATO which had not invited the country to
join the alliance in the first round. Serbs and Bulgarians could join the arrangement based
on some cultural and religious commonalities with Russia, and on the traditionally good
relationship among them. As for the Ukraine, it would simply return under the auspices of
its big brother. The structure would work similarly in times of bipolarity. The countries
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included would maintain just few, if any, connections with the West. The result would be
the establishment of a new iron curtain. However, this arrangement also has some positive
features. The situation is similar to that of the cold war, and Russia hopefully would keep
back the Serbs from further ethnic hostilities.
However seemingly unstable, the system may even prevail for a long run if it
succeeds to provide some economic development for the parties. And, to achieve some
kind of initial economic development is not so difficult if one remembers the poor
economic conditions in these countries where the situation is so bad that there is no other
way to get ahead.
The third option is a possible outbreak of hostilities between Albanians and Serbs
in Kosovo. The civil war may than turn to an external conflict involving first Albania,
afterwards Macedonia, Bulgaria, and even Greece. The Balkans, the source of several
armed conflicts throughout history, would turn again into fire. The "Balkans on fire"
option would not leave the West untouched either. Even one member ofNATO, Greece,
could be easily involved, too. Another undesirable result would be the massive flow of
refugees toward western countries as happened during the war in Bosnia. The experience
of the Bosnian war shows that such a conflict would affect Hungary, too. There would
appear breaches of Hungary's sovereignty both on the land and in the air. The refugees
would go through Hungary and some of them would acquire shelter from Hungary as
well.
The forth scenario, "in the name of Russian brethren," is the worst of all because it
would involve large armies with probably large scale military operations. This case is
61
when Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a total war to restore Russian hegemony with a
casus belli of mistreatment of Russian minorities in Ukraine. The effect would be similar
to the Balkanian one: possible spill over of armored clashes, and huge number of war
refugees heading toward the West through Hungary.
The second option, the "rolling down of a new iron curtain" has the highest
probability to occur. It is not necessary that all of the countries mentioned above become
members of the Russian-led family. For instance, Romania may resist the Russian
expansion. On the other hand, there will certainly be countries prone for whatever reason
to Russian subordination. Besides of its hegemonic attempts, Russia is keen to keep
NATO away from its borders as far as possible.
One additional momentum is still important for Hungary. Even in the last two war
cases, a large scale attack against Hungary is hardly imaginable. The diminishing threat of
a total war against Hungary is due to NATO's invitation of the country to join the alliance.
Even ifRomania, or Slovakia had an attack against Hungary on their minds, they probably
would abandon that idea because in case of an armed invasion they would have to face the
NATO military machine. The near presence ofNATO is a sufficient containing force for
the Ukraine, and Russia, too. This way, NATO would play the role of a stabilization force
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The chapter has addressed two topics. First part was a description of the security
perception on a global perspective. Analyzing the current development of security
challenges, three facts seem relevant. First, the perception of security has obtained a
broad interpretation. Besides the conventional political and military dimensions, economic
stability, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ecological security, and other
security factors have to be considered. Second, the termination of the Cold War
diminished the menace of a large-scale military threat. Concerning this second
development, the military side of security provisions has lost its significance. Third,
security threats have shifted from a single country level to regional and global levels.
The second part has undertaken an analysis of Hungary's close security
environment, picking up five countries for inquiry. The countries chosen represent
Hungary's neighbors which have some disputes with Hungary, or constitute some kind of
threat for the country. Russia and Ukraine have been chosen because they are relevant
powers of the region with the capability to influence the development of events in the CEE
region. The overall picture of the analysis points is that two issues are particularly
threatening for the region. The ethnic disputes and hegemonic aspirations have already
caused a bloody war on the Balkans. The recent developments are sharpening the conflict
between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo which easily can result in the revival of military
clashes, and may even involve the neighboring countries. Russia, with its overemphasized
concerns for Russian people in former Socialist republics, and its desire to regain its
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influence constitutes another threat to the security of Europe. The other painstaking issue
is economic difficulties shaking the countries in transition. The crisis is especially deep in
Romania and the Ukraine. These two mutually reinforcing problems impede the process
of democratization and pave the way for extremist forces.
The analysis also predicts four possible developments of international relations in
the CEE region. The option of "peaceful co-operation and development," though
unfeasible in a near future, have to be a common target for all players in the region. The
"rolling dawn of a new iron curtain" seems to be a viable scenario. There is a possibility
of military conflicts in two regions: Kosovo, and the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The task of the organizations and countries involved in the European security structure is
to prevent the emergence ofnew hostilities and ethnic conflicts as well as to direct the
flow of events toward the optimistic.
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m. SECURITY PROVISION AS A MULTIPLE PUBLIC GOOD
Once, security policy and international affairs were understood as terms embracing
the same area of activities of the state and were called "high politics." While other
spheres, like economic affairs, were thought to be inferior, or "low politics." The
expansion of interstate interactions, the escalation of international trade and economic
relations shifted the notion of low politics into the high realm. The globalization of the
threat perception also makes it necessary to handle questions of security in a complex
way.
In parallel with the development of international relations, scholars have
introduced several theories for modeling the operations in the field of external affairs.
Based on the realm of public goods, thinkers of the economic discipline have also
developed a group of theories to analyze the effectiveness of alliances and to show the
pattern of inter-alliance burden-sharing. The early economic theories have assumed
restrictive assumptions which prevented an approach the its reality. Mark A. Boyer has
suggested a theory of alliances — the "multiple product model"— which relaxes the
previous simplifications. The current paper assumes Boyer' s theory as a means for
identifying a security policy portfolio for Hungary.
This chapter, based on Boyer' s work, compares the two economic theories —
public goods and joint product models — with the multiple model approach. The
comparison extends to the assumptions of these models, to the interpretation of
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optimality, and the free-riding hypothesis. Finally, there follows an introduction of means
and the dimension of the multiple product model. The current thesis suggests including
the area of external economic cooperation as a possible area of inquiry for the multiple
product approach.
A. LOOKING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY
The theory of public goods is an adequate approach to explore defense alliances
formed to achieve a common purpose. However, the initial public goods and the joint
product model have accepted several simplifications: single product— military defense—
approach, equality of costs of production across the alliance members, and the non-
consultation assumptions. To relax these limitations, Boyer has suggested considering the
alliances as producers of multiple security products, to take into account the production
cost differences through comparative advantages, and to incorporate consultation into the
model.
1. The Theory of Public Goods in International Relations
Nations, in pursuit of their own security objectives, often formed alliances or acted
together in the past. Military cooperation in history rarely lasted longer than the end of
the war that the alliances were established to combat. The history of NATO has been
different. The organization had been established to contain the spread of communism and
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to counterbalance the former Soviet Union and its allies. The goal to build up an adequate
defense capability has been achieved through the collective actions of allied nations.
Another field of joint multinational actions is the cultivation of international trade
regimes. Examples are abundant: the World Trade Organization (WtrO, earlier GATT),
the European Union (EU, formerly Common Market), the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and the Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA, or COMECON). Here also, the trade regimes are
maintained by permanent joint undertakings of different nations.
Besides joint actions of participating nations to produce the common defense or to
facilitate free trade, the consumption of goods provided by collective defense
arrangements or under international trade regimes has a collective character. In economic
theories, provisions of this type are called public goods - independent of the fact that the
goods or services are provided for citizens of a single country or for a group of states in
an alliance. Public goods are nonrivalrous in consumption, and nonexcludable in use. 91 A
good is nonrivalrous in consumption if more than one person can enjoy the advantage of
that good once provided. For example, the public lights on the streets can be used by
everyone who goes along the street and the lights are turned on. Under non excludability,
we understand that it is impossible or impractical to maintain exclusive control over the
use of that good. For instance, nuclear deterrence, as established, serves the interest of all
alliance members, and even those of the nonmembers. Nevertheless, the stability produced
91
Weimer, D.L. and Vinning, A.R. Policy Analysis , Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1992, p.42.
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by nuclear deterrence is used by all nations despite their contribution or failure to
contribute. Common defense and international trade provisions possess the features of
public goods.
The cooperation of different nations is the center of focus of several theories. For
example, integration theory, regime theory, hegemonic stability theory, and game theory
all are models of provision of certain goods, private or public, through collective effort.
However, Mark A. Boyer in his book argues that the public goods model is the best suited
to describe international cooperation:
[PJublic goods theory can accomplish all the tasks performed by other
theories of cooperation. It also can provide a more comprehensive
theoretical approach for the analysis of international cooperation than it
provided by the other approaches.
Moreover, in contrast to all other approaches except possibly game theory
in its more complex form, public goods theory facilitates direct evaluation
of the success of the action taken by members of a collective in providing
the goods in question. [...] The public goods approach lends itself directly
to the evaluation of the inputs and outputs of security cooperation, in
contrast to the other approaches, which are oriented more to the process of
92
cooperation.
2. Restrictive Assumptions in Economic Models of Defense Alliances
The application of public goods theory to the model of alliances, first accomplished
in 1966, was introduced by Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser in their paper An
Economic Theory of Alliances. Analyzing this early work
93
,
Mark A. Boyer finds that
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Boyer, M.A. International Cooperation and Public Goods , The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993,
p. 10.
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Boyer, M.A. International Cooperation and Public Goods , The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993,
pp. 14-20.
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though the model is a verifiable description of the alliance behavior, is in harmony with
empirical evidences and is supported by scholars, it assumes three overly restrictive
assumptions.
First, the model focuses on a single, purely public good: military defense. In Olson
and Zeckhauser's approach, two nations of an alliance determine their individual defense
spending based on reaction functions, with each other defense provision serving as
independent variables. While the reaction curves are derived from the use of the spill-in
defense capability, which results in the collective provision and the non excludability of the
defense public good. This approach neglects that nations pursue a wide range of policy
tools in providing for their security.
Second, this original model assumes that the costs to provide the defense good are
identical across nations. Rather, the costs of products are rarely equal. Costs may
significantly differ across countries. The differences can be explained by different
efficiencies of industries, different prices of labor, and so on. This simplification prevents
taking into account the comparative advantages of countries in different fields and also
contributes to distort the evaluation of the burdens borne by nations.
Third, the Olson-Zeckhauser's model disregards the consultation among alliance
members. The assumption is that nations allocate their resources between defense and
other goods in isolation. This approach of resource provision only provides for an optimal
allocation of resources inside a single country through the utility maximization of that
nation. Under conditions of an alliance, the optimality of production can be achieved just
on a theoretical level. The alliance does not possess an efficient incentive system which
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would provide for an optimal level of contribution by allies. On the other hand, the non
consultation assumption contradicts the actual practice of the alliance. In case ofNATO,
member-states are in permanent negotiations with each other at the NATO headquarters in
Brussels, and other forums of the Western alliance.
The next generation of scholars, Todd Sandler and his associates, have improved
the model introducing the "joint product" approach, refining the pure public good
assumption. The "joint product model" is based on the notion that the defense product
supplied by the alliance yield both public benefits for the alliance as a whole, and private
gains for individual nations. The approach is better understood if we consider the
conventional means ofwar fighting. Conventional weapons can be used to a higher extent
by the nation that deploys them than by other members of the alliance. Thus, the
conventional weaponry possesses the character of excludability of private products to
some extent. While, for instance, the nuclear deterrence can be perceived as purely public
as far as the extension of the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States to one
European nation yields the same level of deterrence for the other European allies, even
though they do not incur extra expenses for that provision. Placing the weaponry and the
deterrence and defense capability of the alliance, in a continuum ranging from purely
private to purely public goods has helped to better describe the behavior of the alliance
members, and to better understand the pattern of resource allocation in the alliance.
However, the joint product model has also retained all the other restrictions of the earlier
approach.
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3. Assumptions of the Multiple Goods Model
In an effort to improve the early economic models of alliances, Mark A. Boyer has
introduced the "multiple goods model" of international relations. Boyer's approach has
retained the theory of public goods as an adequate means of inquiry for alliance
cooperation. He has also suggested relaxing the three main limitations of the previous
models. The single military good approach has been changed for a comprehensive
assessment of security provisions. The single price assumption has been substituted with
the comparative advantages in public goods trade. Finally, the decision making in
isolation has been replaced by permanent consultation among members.
The history of NATO suggests that the Western Alliance has achieved several
policy goals: provisions for an adequate military capacity, economic prosperity, providing
foreign aid for third world countries and maintaining successful international monetary
cooperation. However, the cited models take care only of the military dimension. The
globalization and diversification of threats to security also require a comprehensive
approach to the security policy of nations. Nations, of course, cultivate a wide variety of
policy tools in providing for security. The multiple product model proposes to consider
just this trend in order to get a better idea about the operation ofthe alliance and a broader
picture on the burden-sharing pattern.
Different actions beyond the maintenance of a single military capability provide not
only a private benefit for a single country but result in public gains for the whole alliance.
For instance, the aid provided for developing countries not only helps maintain a good
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image of the donor nation as a private benefit but promotes a pro-Western attitude and
respect for democracy as a public gain for the entire alliance. Also, a country on the
geographical edge of an alliance may obtain private gains from improving
multidimensional relations with the neighboring nonmember countries while providing
public good for the alliance through an enhanced stability and security of the region
acquired by good international affairs. Therefore, the nonmilitary services, and provisions
have to be also assessed among contributions to the alliance.
Nations trade with each other for two reasons: the differences in costs, and prices
for the same goods; Nations may be short of certain goods which they can obtain through
international trade. As a result, under liberal trade regimes, nations mutually adjust their
production structures according to their relative advantages— comparative advantage—
and make mutual profits from the trade. This concept is true not only for the private
goods but in goods the public sector, too. Some kind of security good can be produced
cheaper or with a higher efficiency by one nation than the other. Taking advantage of this
possibility, nations may specialize on production of common goods they have advantage
in, thus relieving resources for other purposes. This way, the trade with public goods,
similarly to the private sector, increases the efficiency of security provisions, and improves
the security of the alliance.
Alliances, in general, are formed on the basis of common interests and the free
decision of members to join the alliance. This notion supposes that nations in an alliance
cooperate for the sake of the common goal and consider the decisions of their allies in
making their own decisions. For the consultation purposes, alliances establish permanent
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frameworks for regular interactions which, in turn, develop an obligation to contribute and
also provide a possibility of exercising pressure from the side of other members as non-
contributors. Therefore, consultation has to be considered as a method of common
planning and control of performance for the common purpose.
B. OPTEMALITY AND THE FREE-RIDING HYPOTHESIS OF DEFENSE
ALLIANCES
Lacking adequate incentives, the public goods and joint product approaches have
concluded that alliances operate on a suboptimal level. The evidences of the models have
shown that some members— the free-riders— contribute less to the collective defense
than the others. Boyer has argued that incorporating the public good trade into the model
the alliance can get closer to an optimal level of production. The public good trade
prevails due to comparative advantages, and can be realized through permanent
consultation among alliance members.
1. Optimality of Defense Provisions
It is easier for a single nation to decide about the size of its own military force and
find an optimal way of allocating its resources between defense and non-defense goods
than in an alliance. In fact, there are no incentives in an alliance inducing a level of
contribution by single nations which would provide optimal provision of the public good
under the Olson and Zeckhauser public good model. As Olson and Zeckhauser point out:
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[E]ach ally gets only a fraction of the benefits of any collective good that is
provided, but each pays the full cost of any additional amounts of the
collective good. This means that individual members of an alliance or
international organization have an incentive to stop providing the public
good before the Pareto-optimal output for the group has been provided. 94
The "joint product" model does not promise to solve the problem of optimality of
the collective defense production either. The model has shown that the placement of
weaponry on the continuum from public military deterrence to the highly private
conventional defense capability influences the level of contribution by individual members.
Evidences suggest that defense alliances with conventional equipment would perform
closer to the optimal level than in the case of Olson and Zeckhauser's model, or in case of
an alliance relying exclusively on nuclear deterrence.
While the multiple public goods model cannot either guarantee an optimal
provision of public goods, it approaches closer to an optimal level of output, argues
Boyer. This move toward optimality can be provided through alliance trade along the
comparative advantage line. Permanent consultation among members offers the possibility
to learn each other incentives, and recognize the field of comparative advantages of
individual nations. During negotiations, members can volunteer or be pushed toward their
fields of relative advantages, thus improving the performance of the entire alliance. After
analyzing the results of different theories on international trade and cooperation, Mark
Boyer concludes:
94
Olson, M. And Zeckhauser, R., An Economic Theory of Alliances , RAND Corporation, RM-4297-ISA,
1966, p. 35.
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[Consideration of multiple goods not only facilitates agreements but
promotes specialization and moves the collective outcome closer to an
optimal solution.
95
2. The Free-Riding Hypothesis
Already, Olson and Zeckhauser's work has introduced the notion of "free-riding"
for the defense alliance context. They conclud that a nation which puts a higher value on
the defense good will afford disproportionately more for the common purpose than others.
To put it differently, the "free-riding" means disproportionality of burdens and benefits
across the alliance.
The "joint product" model has also shown evidences for the "free-riding"
phenomenon. In fact, Sandler and others have found five large alliance members —
Canada, Italy, West Germany, United Kingdom, and France— undercontributing to the
common defense.
Traditional studies on the "free-riding" assumption have compared the defense
expenditures across countries as a percentage of the national income (GDP) or used the
regression analysis of defense expenses incurred by allied nations. Katsuaki Terasawa and
William Gates have taken a different approach. Comparing an isolationist policy to the
collective provision, they have found the "free-riding" hypothesis misleading:
Alliance membership enables countries to simultaneously reduce defense
expenditures and increase national security. In a voluntary defense alliance,
no member can be worse off than in the isolation case. Conclusions that
95
Boyer, M.A. International Cooperation and Public Goods , The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993,
p. 35.
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some alliance members shoulder the burden of other members are
inappropriate.
96
The multiple product model also offers a solution for the "free-riding" problem. It
states that specialization of a country on the fields where comparative advantages prevail
and negotiations among members not only increases the optimality of the defense
provision but pushes toward a higher contribution of alliance members:
When free riding is identified in the alliance context, the analyst should
examine other alliance contributions to discover the specialization of the
apparent free rider. Free riding is less likely the norm and more likely an
indication that specialization and trade of public goods is occurring. 97
C. DIMENSIONS OF THE MULTIPLE PUBLIC GOODS MODEL
The multiple product model assumes maintenance of several policy tools in
security provision. The alliance cooperation also goes beyond the single military means
embracing fields such as providing economic aid or international monetary cooperation.
To exploit comparative advantages — political, and economic — allied nations may
specialize on different fields of contribution. In addition to economic aid, and monetary
cooperation, this paper suggests considering external economic cooperation as an area for
allies to contribute. External economic cooperation is an important field both for
96
Terasawa, K. and Gates, W., Alliance Burden Sharing: Equity is in the Eves of the Beholder, p. 29.
97
Boyer, M.A., International Cooperation and Public Goods . The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993,
p. 43.
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individual— old, and to-be-members— countries and the alliance as a whole. Cultivating
close economic affairs with nations outside the alliance helps to promote the security on
the perimeter of the alliance, and offers a valuable dimension to contribute for the
countries on the eastern edge of the Western alliance — primarily nations invited last
summer to join NATO.
1. Military versus Nonmilitary Contribution in the Western Alliance
The traditional public good, and "joint product" models have measured the
contribution of alliance members through a single military dimension. This approach has
led to ambiguous results about the effectiveness of the alliance, and the equality of burden
sharing among members. These theories have only extended to the military field, and have
assessed neither the influence of comparative advantages, nor the benefits of
specialization. Nor have the early theories paid attention to Article 2 of the Washington
Treaty:
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by
bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these
institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well
being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic




The North Atlantic Treaty . Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949, Article 2.
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Analyzing the operation of the Western Alliance, Mark Boyer has found ample
evidence for specialization. After an examination of foreign aid donation, international
monetary cooperation, and other fields of contribution, he has come to the conclusion that
individual nations may bear a larger burden on one or two areas but are free riders on
other fields. The multi product model has shown a more even distribution of burdens than
the early theories.
Recently, the changed security environment and the globalization of threat
perception also calls for a multidimensional security provision, and a comprehensive
evaluation schema of members' contribution in an alliance. NATO, too, has recognized
the need for an altered approach to security:
But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation,
the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means
are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the
consequences from the fact that security and stability have political,
economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable
defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the
Alliance requires a broad approach to security."
This statement underlines again the necessity for harmonization of the
measurement and variety of contributions. As Boyer puts it:
[Expenditure categories other than military are considered important by
the allies and, therefore, should be included in any evaluation of Western
alliance burden sharing. 10°
99
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2. Public Good Trade and Comparative Advantages
After recognizing the necessity of a multidimensional approach to the evaluation of
contribution to the common purpose, the next step is the introduction of ways how the
collective arrangement can take place. The way to the common purpose lays through
trade among allied nations. The basis for the trade is the comparative advantages known
since David Ricardo introduced his theory of international trade. In case of the public
good trade, political comparative advantages should also be considered in addition to the
traditional economic ones.
Contributions to a defense alliance are determined in a "two-level game." The
tasks are determined and shared at several forums of the alliance. While assuming alliance
obligations, politicians should take into account the preferences of their constituencies,
too. Essentially, there are no fully identical approaches to security in different countries.
Consequently, the differences in the mix of policy instruments of a country create political
advantages in line with the domestic preferences of nations. On the other hand, the
domestic policy agenda does not offer a wide range of actions for the decision makers. To
act entirely against the will of their supporters would equal a political suicide for
politicians.
Examples can better demonstrate the notion of political advantages. For instance,
if a country like the United States prefers to maintain modern capable military force, it
would allocate more financial resources for defense spending. Whereas another country,
such as Canada, may prefer to take part in peacekeeping missions, it will compose, train,
and deploy special troops for promoting security in crisis areas. To step beyond the
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military means, one can consider the case of Japan. Japan cultivates a wide range of
policy tools for providing security. Defense spending in Japan is low — about 1% or
lower of its GDP— in comparison to several countries, while Japan devotes considerable
resources for economic aid, and trade promotion purposes. Thus, Japan probably has
political advantage in promoting security through establishing trade interdependencies, and
spreading the notion of democracy.
Economic comparative advantages are understood in a traditional sense for the
public good trade. Countries have different endowments of resources, such as labor,
capital, technologies determining the costs and efficiency of production. These differences
also influence the decisions of member states about their contribution to the alliance. For
instance, a country may specialize in the production of a certain kind of weapon and
supply it for the whole alliance cheaper than anyone else due to technological advantage
and economies of scale. Another nation may choose some labor intensive service or
activity for specialization because of a low domestic cost of labor.
In the case of public goods, the trade usually takes place by involving money. The
mechanisms for the public good trade are consultations. Negotiations can take place
regularly among alliance members. During consultations, the partners learn each other
preferences, comparative advantages and may come to a mutually advantageous solution.
Frequent consultations teach decision makers about the value of cooperation in pursuing
multidimensional security.
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3. Economic Cooperation as a Means of Promoting Security and Stability
The analysis conducted in Chapter II shows that all of the five CEE countries face
serious economic difficulties. The deepening of the economic crisis may result in internal
unrest, growing political instability, and may even threaten the existence of nation states.
Another worrisome outcome of economic problems can be the strengthening of
nationalistic voices, and the blaming of national minorities or neighboring countries for
difficulties. All of these outcomes suggest an increased probability of a worst case
scenario — continued internal conflicts and civil wars, the reemergence of the "iron
curtain"; and the worst of all, the rise of interstate hostilities or external wars with the
involvement ofRussia (see Table 1).
The most effective ways to address the economic problems are an intensive
international trade, economic cooperation for reorganization of obsolete industry
structure, capital investment, establishment of joint ventures, providing assistance in
reform of health care systems, and so on. Establishing a dense net of economic
connections leads to external interdependences which in turn reduce the perceived threat
among nations, promotes confidence building, stabilizes the security environment,
prevents the rolling down of a new iron curtain. Therefore, Sperling and Kirchner are
right to state:
The most effective instruments in the diplomatic toolbox of the Western
democracies are economic and financial: the extension of free trade
agreements, a stable and calculable macroeconomic environment, financial
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aid and technical assistance to easy the transition to the market economy,
and financial support to redress the environmental degradation and easy the
debt inherited from fifty yeas of economic mismanagement.
1 l
The newcomers to NATO — the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland — have
historical advantages on the economic field to engage the countries of CEE in economic
cooperation. The invited nations have had developed economic and trade connections
with other socialist countries during the CMEA — Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance — period. These three countries are also aware of the market in the CEE
region, and possess considerable practices in the field. The knowledge of Russian
language also makes easier any type of cooperation with countries ofthe region.
On the other hand, the promotion of economic relations not only contributes to the
economic recovery of the states outside NATO. It also reinforces the results of economic
transformation in the three to-be-members countries. These countries can serve as
"bridges," and be active participants in this process. In turn, two results could be
achieved. First, using their comparative advantages the new members of the Western club
may choose the economic field for their contribution in the West's security portfolio.
Second, the economic development reached due to reestablished economic relations
would provide the means for their alliance contribution on other fields of collective
provisions.




Table 2 summarizes the differences of three economic models of alliances. The
table shows that the multiple product model addresses the limitations of the previous
approaches. Therefore, the multiple product model is well suited to analyze the operation
of a defense alliance, and to measure the contribution of different nations.
The comprehensive approach taken by the multiple product model is in harmony
with the globalization of threat perception, and habit of nations to provide for security
through multiple channels. Evaluating members' contribution to the common security on
several fields offers a broader picture on the burden sharing pattern. The comprehensive
measurement also shows nations rarely take a free rider course on the expense of the
others.
Incorporating comparative advantages into the alliance model provides for trade
with public goods and a more conscious division of tasks inside the alliance. The
mechanisms for the trade are consultations, a common practice in the Western alliance.
The trade and utilization of comparative advantages push the alliance closer to an optimal
provision for security.
The suggestion to extend the model into the external economic cooperation
mirrors the diminishing role of military means of security provision. On the other hand,
improved economic relations with countries of the CEE region yield two advantages for
the alliance. First, it promotes the security in the region through establishment of mutual
interdependence, and spread of democratic values to the eastern countries. Second,
international trade and developed economic relations strengthen the economic
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achievement of the countries invited to join NATO, thus making for them easier to




































































































































































































































IV. HUNGARY IN NATO
In any alliance, the credibility of members' commitment and contribution to the
alliance are crucial. The commitment shows the credibility of intention to contribute.
Under contribution, we understand the actions and other provisions of members for
achieving the common goal. This chapter undertakes to demonstrate Hungary's
commitment to NATO and proposes a portfolio of security provisions for Hungary to
contribute to the common purpose.
A. COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE
The commitment of Hungary to NATO should be considered valid for two
reasons. First, Hungary had several alternatives to provide for her own security.
However, the country found membership in NATO as the most effective way to provide
for her security. Recognition of the necessity for Hungary to become a member ofNATO
is a real incentive ensuring a high probability of future contributions.
Second and most important, both the general public, and the political parties voted
in favor of Hungary's NATO membership. The vote cast on July 15, 1997 in Parliament
resulted in a unanimous "YES" for membership. 102 The binding referendum of November
16, 1997 showed that the general public entirely favored the joining the Alliance. The
high level of support — more than 85% of votes cast — authorized politicians to assume
obligations in NATO.
102
"Unanimous Parliamentary YESfor NATO," The Hungarian Observer, July 1997, p. 10.
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1. Hungary's Way to NATO
The end of bipolarity significantly changed the power structure in Europe. The
newly democratized countries found themselves in a "gray area." Hungary, too, had to
find a new solution to provide for her own security without Soviet supervision. Since
1989, the country has been actively seeking an adequate solution for security and stability.
Before and in parallel with application for NATO membership, Hungary faced different
and at least theoretically existing security alternatives.
The following section will make assumptions about the possible development of the
European power structure. Then, alternative security approaches that Hungary could
follow will be discussed. The neutrality option and the alternative of bandwagoning with
Russia should be considered as single sided solutions to address the security question as far
as these two options offer a solution to face only military threats. On the other hand,
collective provisions, particularly the membership in NATO, are preferred by Hungary as
approaches to its security.
During the period prior to the invitation by NATO, Hungary learned more about
the advantages of belonging to the Western alliance. This recognition served as an
initiative for Hungary to commit itself to the organization and to deliver contributions
under her capabilities.
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a. The European Security Complex
According to Hakan Wiberg's point of view: "During the past three
centuries Europe has formed a security complex of its own."
A security complex is a group of states with strongly linked security issues.
A country can rarely achieve such a level of isolation that is not affected by or it does not
affect the security of others. Several security complexes could be identified all over the
world. The linkage is tighter inside the group and weaker with outsider countries while the
groups also are linked with each other. In the case of Hungary, it is acceptable to consider
just the European complex as far as the country is situated in Central Europe, and because
of its small size cannot influence distant countries. On the other hand, Hungary is mainly
affected by its neighbors and powers situated in the European complex.
In the nine years since the collapse of the socialist system and the end of the
Cold War, the future of a European security arrangement is still uncertain. There are three
emergent scenarios for power arrangement in Europe depending mainly on the international
engagement of the United States and internal development in Russian. The first option,
based on Russia's economic recovery, is the emergence of a strong Russia with hegemonist
ambitions:
The hidden agenda of the Russian leaders, however, is their wish to restore
the country's hegemonic position, at least on a regional basis, and to regain
103
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, ed. by Bauwens W., Clesse A., and Knudsen O. F., Brassey's, 1996, p. 33.
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control of territories and other natural and man-made resources that they
lost in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
104
Assuming the United States retains its interest in Europe and remains
engaged in European security matters similarly to the Second World War period, there
could be perceived a reemergence of a new bipolarity and appearance of a new dividing line
in Europe. The situation is widely accepted by both sides. The question for the new
democracies in Central Europe would be on what side of the dividing line they are on.
After forty plus years under a Soviet influence, Hungary and the other ex-socialist countries
in Eastern Europe are keen to belong to the West.
A second possible power arrangement could be the formation of a
multipolar Europe. In this scenario, the United States pursues the policy of isolation. In
Europe there are a few local powers, for example, Germany, France, and Russia. Under
this arrangement, the balance of power is unstable and will start a competition for
leadership in the region. Therefore, this scenario contains the highest uncertainty and is the
most dangerous for small states like Hungary.
The third case is the emergence of a single Western European pole formed
around the European Union. In this situation the United States can be in isolation or in
cooperation with the European region. Russia, weak to challenge the strong Western pole,
then can be immersed in its economic and internal troubles or drawn into the single
104
Sheffer G., "The Security ofSmall Ethnic States: A Counter Neo-Realist Argument, " in The National
Security of Small States in a Changing World, ed. by Inbar E., and Sheffer G., Frank Cass & Co. LTD,
1997, p. 28.
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European pole. This arrangement would offer a close connection with the European pole
for the new democracies and also would provide a secure international environment.
Not one of these three scenarios could be seen as totally certain even in
1998. However, events seem to develop toward a strong Western Europe cooperating
with the United States. Russia faces serious domestic difficulties while strives to gain back
its influence at least in its closest neighbors. The situation was even more uncertain at the
beginning of the 1990s when Hungary was looking for new security provisions.
b. The Neutrality Option
The Hungarians have maintained some nostalgia for a neutral status since
the revolutionary attempt for democratization in October 1956. Neutrality, as a security
option, was often mentioned at the time of the collapse of the socialist system. It was
perceived as a preferable arrangement to the membership in the Warsaw Pact where
military organs continued to exist until April 1991:
And lots of voters want Hungary to be like Austria. Avantgardists in
Moscow do not balk at the idea of Hungarian neutrality: Hungary has no
great strategic importance, and Russia might even benefit from having
another Austria or another Finland as a neighbor. 105
However, by the end of 1991 Hungary realized that the neutrality was an
unrealistic option.
106
Neutrality could be an adequate solution in a new bipolarity situation
105
"Comrade Crackdown, " The Economist October 28, 1989, p. 15 (U.K. Edition p. 13).
Some realistically thinking diplomats and politicians never saw the neutrality as a viable option.
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with guarantees of status quo by the superpowers. Neutrality for Hungary is also
unfeasible because of her geographic situation, her economic troubles, and the possibility
for emergence of the security dilemma around the country. Neutrality is a very expensive
way to gain security. To maintain the credibility of neutrality, the country has to preserve a
large and strong army. Hungary has inherited obsolete armed forces from the socialist era.
To modernize that army and maintain it for preserving a neutral status would overwhelm
the country's financial capabilities. The Hungarian President expressed it evaluating the
membership on NATO:
The cost of remaining neutral would have been more than that of
joining NATO, said Hungarian President Arpad Goncz. He said
neutrality was financially not an option for Hungary and described
NATO as an "ideal" alliance. 107
Neutrality could trigger the security dilemma. Foundation and maintenance
of a strong army might well prompt a feeling of threats in neighboring countries. They
would probably respond with an increase of their own military capabilities. The overall
result would be an increasing level of insecurity, fear, and a high level of tensions within the
region. Remember, the pockets ofHungarian minorities in neighboring countries make this
a realistic scenario. Neighbors could evaluate Hungary's military build up as preparation to
gain back territories lost after World War I.
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c. Bandwagoning with Russia
Bandwagoning is a type of behavior of mainly small countries to ally with
the close regional hegemon to avoid its threat. In this century, Hungary alternated between
two powers: Germany and Russia. Germany is now under control in NATO and the
European Union. Its behavior does not indicate Germany's attempt at hegemony in
Europe. Yet, the bandwagoning with Russia still remains as a theoretical option.
Hungary's choice to ally with Russia is a function ofRussia's relative power and the quality
of connections with and guarantees from the side ofWestern Europe and the United States.
However theoretical, Hungary's bandwagoning with Russia could not be left out of
consideration. Allen Sens pointed out:
Balancing or bandwagoning behavior may take place in Central Europe and
the Balkans. In the absence of any overarching security arrangements, such
as membership in NATO, small states in Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union may bandwagon to great powers or balance against perceived
threats as a response to their security concerns.
108
Hungary's bandwagoning with Russia would be an option under bipolarity
and even more in a multipolar Europe. This case could happen only if the western powers
would leave Hungary to her own fate. On the other hand, Hungary would not unilaterally
conclude such an arrangement with Russia again on her own intentions. A similar step
would be strongly opposed by the general public. Hungary has always maintained a feeling
108
Sens, A. "Small States Security in Europe, " in the Small States end Security Challenge in the New
Europe , ed. by Bauwens W., Clesse A., and Knudsen O. F., Brassey's, 1996, p. 88.
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of belonging to the western part of Europe. Nevertheless, even if a new military alliance
with Russia was highly undesirable for Hungary, it could not be ruled out until the North
Atlantic countries showed certain commitment toward the new Central and East European
democracies.
d. Collective Approaches
As far as the above-mentioned two options providing for only military
defense turned out to be unfeasible or undesirable, there remains the possibility to provide
for security on a cooperative level. The cooperative approach to security can meet the
challenges under all of the three scenarios of the European power arrangement. The
choices for Hungary and her Central European partners were to form a Central European
Concert among countries of the former socialist system situated in Central Europe or to
apply for membership in the Transatlantic organizations.
(1) A Central European Concert. The Central European countries
have seen the joining of the Transatlantic organizations, namely the European Union (EU),
and West European Union (WEU) as the primary way to ensure the security of their
countries both economically and militarily. However, for accession into these
organizations, a period of preparation was needed on both sides. First, the former socialist
countries needed to make necessary changes in their political, economic, and other
structures. The applicant countries also needed to meet certain criteria before accession.
100
On the other hand, the Transatlantic institutions also needed some time for their own
development and transformation.
By the end of 1991, it became clear that joining the European Union
(EU) and thus the Western European Union (WEU) will take a much longer time than the
Central and Eastern European countries could accept. This was the moment when the new
democracies put a higher priority to the NATO membership than to the accession to EU.
Meanwhile, the Central European countries started their own
cooperation on several fronts. The goal was to unite their efforts instead of competition
for membership in Western institutions. One example of this cooperation is the Visegrad
treaty signed first by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Uke Nerlich, a deputy
director of Germany's Research Institute for International Politics and Security, suggested
extending the cooperation to the military field, too:
[T]he former Warsaw Pact members should pool their forces by creating
their own military alliance, which would work out security arrangement with
both NATO and Russia. 109
However, the broadening of cooperation to the military field could
not happen for two reasons. First, there was a Russian, that time still Soviet, opposition
to this step since the beginning of the cooperation among the Central European countries:
[S]enior Soviet spokesmen expressed tolerance for new Central European
regional groupings on political, economic, and ecological issues, but were
ino
Nelan, B. W., "ShouldNATO Move East?, " Time . November 15, 1993, U.S. Edition, p. 68.
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uniformly critical of any new associations dealing with military security that
did not include the USSR. 110
The second issue was that the Central Europeans did not really
want to extend their cooperation because of the fear of rejection from their
membership in a Western defense organization, saying that the central European
countries have found a proper solution for their security. In this case, West
would not have to offer membership in NATO, and other Euro-Atlantic
organizations just simple cooperation with the central European arrangement.
(2) NATO Membership. By 1994, the membership in NATO
remained the only acceptable option for the new Eastern European democracies
to provide for their security. This option also seemed to be attainable. NATO
offered cooperation for these countries in different fields and in different
frameworks. Additionally, NATO could provide more than pure military security:
The reasons for NATO's primacy in Europe are threefold. First, it has
effective command and control structure and adequate military resources.
Second, it helps to keep United States in Europe by providing a political
framework through which it can legitimately exercise power on the
continent. Third, NATO serves several military, political, and economic
objectives. 111
Sharp J. M. O. "Security Optionsfor Central Europe, " in The Future of European Security, ed. by
Crawford B., Regents of the University of California, 1992, p.. 61.
Vayrynen R_, "Small States: Persisting Despite Doubts, " in The National Security of Small States in a
Changing World, ed. by Inbar E., and Sheffer G., Frank Cass & Co. LTD, 1997, p. 61.
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However, NATO membership is not perceived in Hungary as the
final provision for security. The Deputy State Secretary of Defense for Integration, Istvan
Gyarmati expressed:
We feel the security of the country can only be ensured if we join the
European Union and NATO. The main reason is not a military threat we
see emerging on our borders; it is much broader than that. We think that
Hungarian national defense can be provided at a much lower cost and that
security and stability in the region can be better ensured if it is provided in a
co-operative manner.
112
Finally in July 1997, Hungary's membership in NATO became a
close reality with the invitation by the Alliance at its Madrid Summit. By that time,
Hungary realized that the most advantageous and cheapest provision for security is NATO
membership. This recognition strengthens Hungary's commitment to the Alliance and
provides for a more predictable the contribution to the collective defense.
2. Internal Stakeholders in Hungary's Security Policy
Additional evidence of Hungary's commitment to NATO is the devotion of its
domestic stakeholders in Hungary's security and foreign policy. All of the internal players
show high commitment to the Alliance.
Table 3 summarizes the expectations and aims of the general public and political
parties represented in Parliament. The table also contains the signs of commitment taken
by domestic stakeholders to NATO. The political parties cited in the table are those which
112
Bunten, K. "Hungary: in Search ofa Secure Future, " Jane's Defence Weekly, June 16, 1997, pg. 21.
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have acquired seats in Parliament at the last general elections in May 1998. The current
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As the domestic component of the "two-level game," the public opinion is
a very important factor in Hungary's contribution to NATO. The domestic political
agenda, and the expectations of the general public determine the freedom of movement for
politicians in the international arena and taking obligations in NATO.
Although the Alliance did not require it, the Hungarian governing parties
considered it important to call a binding referendum about the country's membership in
NATO. The previous opinion polls did not show a convincing ascendancy of supporters
over those who did not favor the Alliance. Researchers found that hesitatant people did
not possess general knowledge about the Alliance.
The referendum was organized on November 16, 1998. The results were
persuasive. More than 85% of those voting answered "yes" to the question, "Do you
want Hungary to ensure its safety by joining NATO?" Laszlo Kovacs, the foreign minister
ofHungary, said:
The turnout of about 50% is a message to the NATO Headquarters and the
member states: it suggests that NATO membership is a national issue, not
only that of the political elite, in Hungary. 113
The result of the referendum allows politicians to allocate more resources
for defense purposes. On the other hand, Hungarians will hardly accept the heavy
financial burdens following NATO membership:
113 NATO Referendum, MTI (Hungarian News Agency), Econews , November 16, 1997.
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Most Hungarians welcome the prospect of NATO membership as a
symbolic step toward full western integration. Yet opinion polls show
Hungarians are generally reluctant to channel more money toward defense,
especially at the expense of social and welfare programs. 114
In order to sustain public support, politicians have two tasks to accomplish.
First, they have to keep the population informed. People should know both sides of the
alliance equitation: costs and benefits of the membership and the current task and
challenges. Second, politicians have to be aware of the public opinion and people's
preferences. Knowledge of the general public's expectations and preferences help
decision makers identify political comparative advantages and compose a proper portfolio
of security provisions that meet the support of the population.
b. Federation of Young Democrats (FiDeSz)
The Federation of Young Democrats 115 won the parliamentary elections
after two rounds on May 10 and 24, 1998. Therefore, this party will get the authorization
from the President to form the new government. Being at power, the FiDeSz will control
the Hungarian security policy in the near future, and its political aims will determine the
NATO contribution and foreign policy of the country.
114
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The main points of FiDeSz's policy can be found in its party program, http://www.fidesz.hu, May
1998.
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FiDeSz is concentrating its force on the economic development of
Hungary. Their main goal is to maintain a steady 7% per year economic growth based on
internal resources, foreign capital investment, and external support from the European
Union.
The security policy of FiDeSz is based on three pillars. The party has seen NATO
as an organization ensuring peace and security in Europe. The second pillar is the
maintenance of good relations with neighboring countries. Regarding this aspect, the
FiDeSz is going to support the Hungarian minorities living in the Carpathian basin and the
third element of is security policy is the maintenance of a smaller but more efficient
military force capable of cooperation with NATO. The modernization of the Hungarian
Defense Force (HDF) should be financed from a rising share of the defense budget in a
growing national income (GDP).
The FiDeSz has always supported Hungary's application and accession to
NATO. The realization of its economic policy depends on the cooperation with the West
and economic relationships with neighboring countries. Therefore, the FiDeSz is going to
maintain good relations both with the West and the countries of the close environment.
These circumstances direct the FiDeSz toward fulfilling all the requirements of NATO
membership, and furthering the stability of the CEE region.
113
c. Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP)
The Hungarian Socialist Party 116 as the largest opposition group in the new
Parliament that will influence the activity of the government and would like to continue
the security policy maintained while it was in power during the previous term. The main
targets of this policy have been gaining full membership in NATO and European Union
(EU), promoting the security of the CEE region and maintaining good relations with
Ukraine and Russia. The primary means of MSZP's security policy have been mutually
advantageous agreements reached through negotiations.
The old Hungarian government headed by the MSZP was the negotiator of
the NATO accession agreement. The delegation has ensured the NATO partners about
Hungary's commitment to contribute to the common purpose. As a last resort of security,
the MSZP supports the modernization of the HDF in order to achieve compatibility with
NATO forces.
d Independent Smallholder Party (FKgP)
The FiDeSz, besides the Hungarian Democratic Forum, needs the FKgP's
cooperation for stable governance in the next four years. Therefore, the FKgP has
sufficient leverage in the work of this new government. The FKgP has always favored
NATO membership, so its support for an adequate contribution to the Alliance is probably
The Electoral Policy Program of the MSZP, March 1998, can be found at
http://www.mszp.hu/polprog.html.
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ensured. However, the party also emphasizes the gains from the membership. Jozsef
Torgyan, the party leader, said after the successful parliamentary voting on NATO
membership on July 15, 1997:
I think that NATO accession must mean for the country not only
obligations but also rights and privileges. This is the orientation the
government should follow in connection with joining NATO; this is the
only possible approach to NATO membership to find favour with the
public.
117
e. Alliance ofFree Democrats (SzDSz)
The Alliance ofFree Democrats118 lost many seats in the last election, so its
influence in Parliament has sufficiently decreased, too. The SzDSz, the coalition partner
of MSZP in the previous government, has pursued a comprehensive approach to the
security of Hungary. Primary importance has been given to the accession to the North-
Atlantic institutions. The policy tools have included maintenance of good relations with
other countries of the CEE region, active participation in regional organizations and
supporting accession of other countries to the Western alliance. Cultivation of tight
economic affairs with former socialist countries has a distinguished role:
"Unanimous Parliamentary YESfor NATO" The Hungarian Observer, July 1997, p. 10.
118
The party program of SzDSz can be read at http://www.szdsz.hu/program/.
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Regional political, economic, and trade cooperation efficiently serves the
aims of European security, which also encourages the development of
practical relations among countries of the CEE area. 119
In spite of its small political influence, the SzDSz will be a supporter of a
satisfactory alliance contribution. The party is also advised to handle security issues from
a broad perspective. However, the SzDSz also supports the modernization of the HDF
and its quick incorporation into NATO's military structure.
/ Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)
The Hungarian Democratic Forum120 is an ally of the FiDeSz. The
Forum's security policy is focused on NATO membership. The party holds as important
the modernization of the HDF and achieving interoperability with NATO countries. The
MDF also devotes distinguished attention to the Hungarian minorities in neighboring
countries. It supports the autonomy aspirations of ethnic groups. An important aspect of
MDF's approach is pursuing effective economic diplomacy for the interests ofHungary.
The MDF is proud of its pioneering role in approaching Western
institutions at the beginning of 1990s when the MDF was the leading party in the
Hungarian government. Therefore, the MDF will be a supporter of Hungary's
119
Foreign Policy-European Integration, Party Program of SzDSz, http//www.szdsz.hu/program, May
1998.
120
The party program ofMDF located at http://www.mdf.hu/valsztas98.
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contribution to the Alliance. On the other hand, the party will probably actively pursue
maximum gain for Hungary from NATO membership.
g. Hungarian Truth and Life Party (M1EP)
The Hungarian Truth and Life Party 121 is the only radical force in the
Hungarian Parliament. The party does not possess a real political influence since it cannot
even form a parliamentary fraction (a fraction can be formed by 15 parliamentary
members). Nevertheless, the MIEP is the single parliamentary party opposing Hungary's
NATO joining. The MIEP has lately made a slight modification in its point of view. The
total rejection of NATO membership has changed with the limitation of Hungary's
participation in NATO's political organization. On the other hand, the MIEP favors the
maintenance of a strong HDF and the modernization required by NATO.
B. HUNGARY'S CONTRIBUTION
The following part of the essay offers a portfolio of security provisions Hungary
may pursue in its contribution to NATO. The suggestion is based upon the results of the
analysis conducted in Chapter II of the Hungarian close security environment. The mix of
security tools is given in Table 4. The table introduces the strategic issues both for NATO
171
Csurka, I. The Nation Builder State. The program ofMIEP, May 1998,
http://www.miep.hu/archiv/nemzetep/nepit.html.
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and Hungary in the CEE region, and shows the corresponding policy approach by
Hungary.
Three dimensions of Hungary's possible contribution are given special attention.
One of the most important contributions by Hungary can be facilitating economic
cooperation in CEE. The result of this provision is twofold. First, it furthers security and
confidence by building everyday connections among countries, decreasing this way the
threat to security on the eastern edge or NATO. Second, it helps to strengthen the
economy of Hungary and other countries, and also shows the primacy of a market
economy, and spreads the western values eastward.
As one of the main concerns in the region is the question of ethnic minorities,
Hungary should approach this dimension carefully. The support of Hungarian minorities
abroad should be provided through obedience of provisions in friendship treaties signed
with neighbors. The cooperation with neighboring nations will also promote national
security. In addition, Hungary's support and assistance to former socialist countries to
approach and get accession in Euro-Atlantic institutions are the best means to help the
Hungarian minorities.
NATO has remained primarily a national defense organization, therefore, the
contribution on the military field is a main element ofHungary's provisions. The instituted
reorganization and modernization of the Hungarian Defense Force (HDF) are indicators of
Hungary's commitment and contribution to NATO's purpose. On the military field, the
118
continuation of armed forces reforms, contributions to the crisis management task, and the
cultivation of military cooperation with neighboring countries are the most important
provisions.
Table 4, and the dimensions described in detail suggest that Hungary has the
possibility to contribute to the common purpose. The evidence from the analysis of
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1. Regional Economic Cooperation
The analysis of countries in Chapter II has shown that the nations of CEE must
meet the most serious difficulties of their economy. Economic troubles can induce
political upheavals, strengthen ethnic tensions and hostilities between nations. Therefore,
the achievement of economic stabilization and the prosperity in CEE countries is vital for
both NATO and Hungary. The western countries, as well as Hungary, may pursue
economic cooperation with CEE nations in order to help them overcome their economic
crises. The primary field of economic connections is external trade, which in turn
promotes security. The role of trade as a security promotion tool is plausibly explained by
Sperling and Kirchner:
[T]rade is one of the primary and most efficient transmission belts of
economic growth and development. Trade is an impartial instrument for
restructuring economies malformed by the allocation labor and scarce
capital by political diktat rather than by the market for over fifty years.
Unimpeded trade between the nations of western, central and eastern
Europe, as well as trade between CEE, is critical to the successful and
timely transition to the market economy and embrace of democracy. The
creation of a dense web of trade interdependences between the nations of
western, central and eastern Europe contributes to greater amity within the
European security space and consequently makes easier and more likely the
construction of a comprehensive and inclusive set of security institutions.
Trade interdependence can create a basis for political trust— an externality
supporting cooperation in other areas impinging directly upon or requiring
the sacrifice or pooling of national sovereignty. 122
122
Sperling, J. and Kirchner, E. Recasting the European Order, Manchester University Press, 1997, p.
134.
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The former socialist countries maintained economic relations in frames of Council
ofMutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In 1989, the share ofCMEA export and import
for Hungary reached 41.5% and 37.8% respectively. By 1993, these indicators fell to
27.1%) and 29.8% levels. The same data for the OECD relation changed in an opposite
direction: increase from 40.4% to 66.0% in export, and from 46.4% to 64.8% in
import123 . The trend, since 1993, is a dynamic growth of trading volumes with the EU
countries, and a slow increase in the CEE segment (Figures 2 and 3 in the Appendix). The
neighboring countries, expect for Austria, occupied only the 12th or lower place in
Hungary's external trade in 1996 (Table 6 in Appendix).
Hungary can contribute to the Western alliance by promoting external trade with
and between CEE countries. Trade promotion costs money. Lowering customs and
tariffs means giving up some part of government incomes. Providing payment guarantees
or preferential loans to facilitate external trade requires budgetary money and invites risk
of nonpayment. Liberal trade regimes have some political costs, too. Lowering trade
barriers places domestic producers into competition with foreign products. Therefore, the
political and financial costs of trade promotion can be included in the contribution to the
alliance.
The framework for facilitating free trade in the CEE region has even been




by Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Last year, Romania also
joined the agreement. The operation of CEFTA seems clumsy, as the Hungary's trading
data with CEE indicates. Vivifying ofCEFTA would be a proper approach to increase the
CEE trading relations.
Another barrier of economic growth in CEE is the lack of capital investment to
modernize the obsolete production structure. The main source of capital may be foreign
investments flowing into CEE countries. However, the actual need for capital is much
higher than capital in its current inflow into the region (Tables 8 and 9 in the Appendix).
Hungary can initiate some measures to attract more working capital into the region. For
example, Hungary can establish special funds to help the establishment ofjoint ventures in
CEE countries. Another means could be the support of Hungarian capital investment in
former socialist countries with preferred taxation and earmarked loans.
In addition to promoting security, extensive economic connections help strengthen
the Hungarian economy, as well. Success of Hungary with a market economy could serve
as an example for other nations. It would be more evidence for the primacy of free
market, democracy, and western institutions attracting other CEE countries to follow
western values. The identity of values, on the other hand, decreases the possibility of
hostilities between nations. Thus, promoting security through economic connections can
be a valuable contribution to the stability of the region and to the purposes of the Western
alliance.
127
2. Supporting Hungarian Minorities
From the analysis of external stakeholders in Hungary's security policy, it has
become clear that one of the hottest issues in the CEE region is the question of national
minorities. The Bosnian War was also deeply rooted in ethnic tensions. Table one in the
Appendix shows that there are more than three million Hungarians living in neighboring
countries. They have family relations and common history with Hungarians in the Mother-
land. It is little wonder that both the political parties and the population of Hungary
maintain a fear of responsibility for their ethnicity.
However, Hungary should pursue a careful policy about the Hungarian minorities.
Even the appearance of revisionism or irredentism should be avoided in relations with
neighbors. The starting point in relations with the neighbors should be the obedience of
provisions laid down in signed friendship treaties.
Three policy tools can be suggested in support of Hungarian minorities. First,
maintenance of close connections with Hungarians, while obeying the officially accepted
methods and channels, can help them in preserving their national identities. For example,
these provisions can embrace cultural exchanges, the offering of scholarship at Hungarian
schools, or the provision of economic aid, if necessary.
Second, economic assistance and mutually advantageous economic relations with
the neighboring countries can sufficiently improve the situation of minorities. This
approach can help the receiving countries overcome their economic difficulties. In turn, it
can improve the situation of ethnic minorities through diminishing the possibility of
internal tensions inside the receiving country.
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The third tool is supporting these countries' aim to approach the Euro-Atlantic
community, and help them meet the criteria of accession into these institutions. Being
members of the EU and signatories of the Schengen treaty on common external (and no
internal) borders would mean citizenship in a common Europe, and an unlimited possibility
of maintaining relations without obstacles.
3. Military Provisions
As far as NATO is a defensive organization, the military contribution by members
is crucial for the alliance. In the case ofHungary, three issues can be raised on the military
field. First, Hungary should possess a modern military force capable of containing
possible aggression against its territory. Second, Hungary can train and maintain forces
suitable to contribute to the new mission — crisis management — of the alliance. Third,
maintenance of military cooperation with former Warsaw Pact members is another field to
promote confidence and security in the CEE region.
Hungary has started the reorganization of her military forces. Recognizing the
general notion to decrease armed forces, and pressed by budgetary difficulties, the
Hungarian Parliament has passed the 88/1995 Resolution which directs the reduction of
army personnel under 60,000. The resolution also provids the introduction of a new force
structure similar to the western armed forces. Under this provision, the Hungarian
Defense Force (HDF) is to consist of immediate reaction forces, rapid reaction forces, and
territorial defense forces. The country has revamped the General Staff ofHDF last year,
129
decreasing its personnel and making it recognizable for its western counterparts.
However, the General Staff still remains independent from the MOD organization. The
integration of the two organizations must be done.
Hungary has made some steps for technical modernization of the HDF. In lieu of
Russian debt payment, Hungary has received 28 of MiG-29s, more than 200 BTR-80 type
armored personnel carriers from Russia, and acquired 100 refurbished T-72 main battle
tanks. Hungary has also placed a $100 million order to Matra Defense of France to
deliver man-portable Mistral surface-to-air missiles. The country has also assumed the
obligation to join the NATO Integrated Air Defense System.
The main issue ofNATO accession is to activate the interoperability ofHDF with
armies of other member states. The most important task in this field is to reach intellectual
and procedural interoperability. The former means training and preparation of officers and
other personnel capable of working with other NATO officials and representatives. The
latter assumes the identity of approaching different tasks and solving problems.
Hungary should also be integrated into the Alliance joint defense planning system.
For this, a domestic planning procedure should be on place. The design of a Hungarian
Defense Planning System has recently been undertaken. This system is intended to form
the annual national strategy on defense that is common in other NATO countries. By the
time of full membership in 1999, this system should be finalized, ready for implementation,
and fit for traditional NATO procedures.
All these and future undertakings must be financed from a shrinking defense
budget. The shares of defense expenditures in GDP for Hungary have been approximately
130
half of the NATO average since 1990 (Figure 4 in Appendix), and is the lowest among
neighboring former socialist countries (Figure 5 in Appendix). Another issue is that in
spite of the assumed obligation to increase the defense budget by 0.1% of GDP yearly by
2001, major acquisitions cannot be financed from the annual appropriations. Therefore,
the intended Defense Planning System should have provisions for long term programs,
too.
The second area of Hungary's military provisions can be the contribution to the
task of crisis management. As Chapter II suggests, the highest probability should be given
to the emergence of local conflicts. The resolution of these conflicts requires trained and
available peacekeeping forces. Hungary may prepare armed units especially trained for
peacemaking, peace support operations, and logistics elements for support. Because of
relatively low labor cost, the country even has a comparative advantage in this field.
Hungary can also establish special training sites for peacekeeping purposes and offer for
joint use by the Alliance. This notion is in harmony with the Alliance is recently emerging
new strategic concept. According to the latest news, NATO has started an 18-month
review of its strategic concept with an emphasis on out-of-era, peacekeeping-type
124
operations.
The third area for contribution is international military cooperation with armies of
the CEE region. Hungary has currently started building a joint peace support battalion
with Romania, and has the intention to establish a similar unit with Slovenia, Austria, and
124
"NATO to Review Us Role as World Order Changes," Jane's Defence Weekly. January 28, 1998, p. 3.
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Italy.
125 The continuation of this process can be the involvement of Slovakia and the
Ukraine. Permanent consultations, and information exchange between defense ministries
and general staffs is another dimension of the international military cooperation.
Knowledge about each other's situation and intentions is a considerable aspect of
confidence building in order to promote regional security.
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has accomplished two purposes. First, it showed that Hungary is
highly committed to NATO. Both the general public, and the political parties have shown
their devotion to the Alliance. This commitment makes credible Hungary's intentions to
contribute to common aims.
Second, there has been proposed a wide range of policy tools Hungary can use to
contribute to the Alliance while addressing the strategic issues in the CEE region. The
suggested provisions are in harmony with NATO concerns about the region, and offer an
answer for a different security challenge in CEE.
The proposed provisions should be parts of an evaluation schema on contribution
by members of the alliance. Cultivating several policy approaches to security with a high
commitment to NATO should result in a favorable evaluation of the country's
125
The Jane's interview with Gen. Vegh, Chief of General Staff of the HDF, Jane's Defence Weekly
.
February 18, 1998, p. 38.
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contribution. Concerning Hungary, Sebastian Gorka, a known defense analyst in the CEE
region writes:
[I]t appears that Hungary, with at least two other "colleagues", has done
enough in the short time since 1990 to demonstrate its true will and has
convinced NATO that it will not be simply a security user but also a
contributor.
126
Gorka, S. "Hungary Reinvents Us Defence Force," Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1 1997, p. 179.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusion of this thesis is that Hungary is able to contribute sufficiently to the
Alliance. The country has an advantage because of her geographic location and also a
need to spread security and stability within the CEE region. An augmentation of security
and stability could be achieved through a cooperative external policy, as well as through
avoiding the appearance of being a military threat against any of her neighbors because of
a spectacular military build-up. In fact, Hungary should pursue a set of security policies
that would prevent the rolling down of a new iron curtain that would prevent permanent
negotiations and cooperation in Europe.
The change in security perception suggests that security cannot be approached
from a singular military perspective. Issues other than the military aspects of security
might be more important at the end of 1990s. For instance, economic prosperity,
prevention of nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation have got into focus of
attention. Therefore, any country's security policy should contain elements to meet
diverse challenges.
The analysis of Hungary's close environment shows that with the termination of
the Cold War, the probability of large scale military aggressions has sufficiently
diminished. However, other sources of political threats still prevail. The history of the
CEE region, and also the ethnic composition of countries draws attention to possible local
conflicts and hostilities. The other lesson from the examination of external players is that
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the main source of instability is economic difficulties characteristic for countries in
transition burdened with ethnic tensions. Economic crises and political instability may lead
some politicians to divert the general public's emotions toward nationalism, blaming the
ethnic minorities for domestic problems, and may result in civil wars or local hostilities.
Hence, nations cannot still entirely refrain from having a sufficient defense capability.
Starting with the assertions above, Hungary, invited to join NATO, should
maintain a security policy that provides for a multidimensional approach. The security
portfolio based on this statement can be Hungary's contribution to the Alliance's mission.
The certainty of the contribution is augmented by the country's commitment to NATO.
Hungary's commitment is evident in two ways. The way Hungary arrived at the
application for NATO membership has made the country recognize that the cheapest,
most effective, and most advantageous method to provide for her security can be found in
collective provisions within the frames of the Alliance. Secondly, both the general public
and political parties have shown their devotion to NATO by voting in favor of membership
in the organization.
In speaking about Hungary's NATO contribution, three particular elements can be
underlined. First, facilitating regional trade and economic connections serve two issues at
once. The establishment of economic interdependencies reduces the incentive of countries
to turn to military methods in the resolution of disputes among themselves. In addition,
this cooperation helps to consolidate the economic situation both in Hungary and
neighboring countries which also furthers the security and stability in the region.
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Economic growth in Hungary is dependent upon external trade and economic cooperation
increases the capability of the country to finance its contribution to NATO.
Second, handling one of hottest issues — ethnic minorities — in the region,
Hungary can promote confidence among countries. The approach to the problem of
ethnic minorities should be based upon provisions of friendship treaties signed with
neighbors. Hungary should avoid even the slightest indication of an intention to intervene
into the internal affairs of its neighbors.
The third field of contribution is the maintenance of an efficient military force with
a primary task to contain any aggression against territorial integrity of Hungary by
threatening the aggressor with effective counteractions, not to mention heavy losses and
casualties. The next objective of the armed forces should be the prevention of a spill-over
of military conflicts from a country's civil war, or from some local wars between
neighboring countries. The military should also be prepared to take part in peacekeeping
missions undertaken by the organization. For this reason, the Hungarian Defense Force
should undergo a comprehensive modernization and reorganization process. To finance
the military reform, the defense budget of the country should be raised to the level
acceptable for the Alliance.
The suggestions for Hungary's security approach is based upon the multiple public
good model introduced by Mark Boyer. The model has provisions to overcome the
restrictive assumptions of previous economic models of alliances. It adds several
dimensions to a single military product by providing for a more realistic evaluation of
members' contributions, and also straightens the burdens borne by members, thus
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diminishing the notion of free riding in the organization. The incorporation of trade with
public goods, and the concept of comparative advantages into the model takes the
common provision closer to an optimal use of resources. Negotiations, a common
practice in the Western Alliance, reveal the advantages of nations on certain fields and are
a mechanism to approach the optimal point of operation.
Finally, Hungary's interests and intentions in NATO are better summed up by
Laszlo Kovacs, Hungarian Minister ofForeign Affairs:
When she wants to join NATO, Hungary does not seek protection from a
military threat. Hungary's determination to become a member in the
Alliance is motivated by the shared values and the desire to belong to a
favorable security environment, and not by fear. In our opinion, NATO
enlargement means the eastward expansion of the region of security and
stability. It is our goal to be part of this region, and enjoy the benefits of
security guarantees of NATO membership. It is also clearly understood
that by joining the Alliance, Hungary will assume the obligation to
contribute to an increased effectiveness of mutual defense as well as to the
enhanced security and stability in our region and in Europe. 127
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Two sets of recommendations are relevant for further consideration. The first
concerns Hungary's security policy and its implementation. The second set suggests some
methodical approaches to continue the work over the multiple public good model.
Hungary should maintain a security portfolio suggested by the thesis. A similar
approach would answer the different security threats the country faces. However, the
127
Kovacs, L. Hungary's Contribution to European Security, an article written for NATO Review by
Hungarian Foreign Minister, http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NATO/ReviewEN.html.
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security environment, the domestic preferences, and financial capabilities are not static.
Therefore, the country has to acquire a system that will support several tasks: regular
reconsideration of the security environment; oversight of the policy and security
challenges; incorporation of the Alliance's requirements into Hungary's policy;
calculation of the financial needs to pursue a certain policy portfolio; the matching of
Hungary's economic capabilities with the budgetary needs; and the consideration of the
general public's opinion and preferences about the security provisions. In order to have a
wide public support, citizens should be informed about the inventions to provide for the
country's security. On the other hand, the defense planners should have information about
the general public's opinion and preferences that can be obtained from regular opinion
polls.
Concerning the multiple public good model, there should be a continual
exploration into the theoretical framework. After a comprehensive analysis of different
models of international relations, there could be developed a mathematical model
developed for computers to explore the viability and validity of the model. Indeed, the
model should incorporate the theory of comparative advantages, take into account the
negotiations, provide directions about an optimal allocation of resources, and also
possibility of comparing the contribution of Alliance members. Finally, the model should
not be restricted to military alliances; it should be appropriate to evaluate other









'//A Areas outside Hungary with//A significant Hungarian minorities
GNB Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Barrage
Source: Chaillot Paper No. 7, May 1993, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, Paris. Quoted in Van den Doel T
Central Europe: The New Alli^? Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
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Table 1 Minorities in Eastern Europe
Gypsies Hungarians Poles Slovaks Others
Byelorussia — — 600 — —
Bulgaria 577 — — — —
Czech Rep. 114 — — 308 —
Hungary 500 — — 120 —
Kosovo — — — — *2m
Lithuania — — 258 — —
Macedonia — — — — *427
Moldova — — ... — + 550
Poland 4 — — 25 ++500
Romania 470 1.6-2m — — —
Slovakia 80 600 — — —
Vojvodina — 500 ... ... ~
* Albanians
+ Russians
++ 300,000 Germans, 200,000 Byelorussians
Source: National statistical offices, EU
Quoted in: The Economist March 13, 1993, p. 17.
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Table 2 Progress in Transition in Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union (selected
countries)
Country EBRD Score





Czech Republic 21 65 1994 +3
Poland 20 55 1992 +5
Hungary 20 55 1994 +3
Slovakia 20 55 1994 +4
The Comers:
Romania 16 35 1993 +2
Russia 16 50 - -15
The Lagers:
Ukraine 9 30 ~ -23
Source: Hardt J. P., Boone J. F., Heintz S. B., Presnall A., Parliamentary Responsibility for Economic
Transition in Central and Eastern Europe , U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, p. 12.
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Table 4 EU Evaluation ofCEE countries applying for membership
Country Political Criteria Economic Criteria
Czech Republic Stable democracy. Legislative
jurisdiction,and fight against corruption
needs to be strengthened. Legislative
guarantees for free press are
unsatisfactory. Discrimination of
Gypsies.
Operating market economy. Corporate
management and financial system have
to be improved. EU competitiveness
could be reached within five years if the
changes on the micro level accelerate.
Hungary Stable democracy. Fights against
corruption needs to be more efficient.
Operating market economy. The
retirement and health care systems are to
be reformed at a high pace. EU
competitiveness will be reached within
five years.
Poland Stable democracy. Legislative
jurisdiction and fight against corruption
needs to be strengthened. The freedom of
the press is slightly restricted. The
compensation has been omitted.
Operating market economy. The
retirement, health care, and banking
systems are to be reformed. EU
competitiveness can be reached within
five years.
Romania Seemingly guaranteed stable democracy,
particularly with the inauguration of the
new government. There are some
troubles surrounding adherence to
protecting basic rights. Significant
efforts are needed to cease the deeply
rooted corruption. Work of courts has to
be improved. Human rights have to be
better protected in procedures of police
and secret services.
Significant improvement in establishing
market economy. Legislative, and
institutional systems need further
consolidation. Macroeconomic
imbalances have to be overcome.
Possible EU competition within five
years but not likely.
Slovakia Though the legislative, and institutional
bases are present, Slovakia does not meet
democratization requirements ofEU.
The government does not obey the
Constitution, rights of other power
branches, and the opposition. The
conditions of Hungarian and Gypsy
minorities have to be improved.
Marketization reforms have occurred,
though certain backslides (price control,
upgrading of state enterprises) are
monitored. In the case of a more
transparent, market oriented economic
policy, Slovakia may obtain EU
competitiveness.
Source: HVG 97/30, July 26, 1997, p. 26.
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Table 5 Distribution of Seats in Hungarian Parliament after
Elections in May 24, 1998



























































































Source: Hungarian Ministry of Industry and Trade at http://www.ikm.iif.hu/foreco/kkk/index.htm.
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Table 7 Hungary's External Trade by Country Groups, 1991-1997
(Million dollars)


















Developing countries 856.6 570.7 483.7 419.9 500.6 503.5 509.4
CEE 2,354.0 2,460.6 2198.8 2,366.0 2,993.5 3,116.5 3,659.0
Others 54.4 46.0 201.3 207.1 435.3 125.2 130.0


















Developing countries 900.1 466.3 547.2 655.0 856.2 1,091.3 1,504.7
CEE 2,685.5 2,752.3 3,619.8 3,322.7 3,538.9 3,851.0 3,957.6
Others 219.1 138.5 229.9 301.3 178.2 246.8 342.1
Total 11,382.1 11,078.9 12,530.3 14,553.8 15,466.3 18,143.7 21,234.1
Source: Hungarian Ministry of Industry and Trade at http://www.ikni.iif.hu/foreco/statistic/back21.htni.
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Source: Hungarian Ministry of Industry and Trade at http.7/www.ikm.iif.hu/foreco/statistic/back21.htm.
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Source: Hungarian Ministry of Industry and Trade at http://www.ikm.iif.hu/foreco/statistic/back21.htm.
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Total 13,208 48,130 61,338
a Excludes international financial institutions,
b 1993-94
Sources: European Commission; International Monetary Fund.
Quoted in: Sperling, J. and Kirchner, E. Recasting the European Order, Manchester University Press,
1997.
Table 9 Gross Capital Needed3 by CEE
(Selected countries)
Estimated gross capital needed by countries of
CEE to reach rough comparability with Western







a This includes the change in the net stock of capital and the cumulative flows of
capital needed to cover depreciation of physical capital stock.
Source: Congressional Budget Office. "How the Economic Transformation in Economic
Will Affect the United States." Washington, December 1990. Quoted in: Parliamentary
Responsibility for Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe. A publication of
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and The Congressional
Research Service. Revised edition, 1996.
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Table 10 Share ofDefense Expenditures, 1990-1995
(%ofGDP)
Year NATO Hungary Slovakia Ukraine Romania Russia
1990 4.0 2.0 3.7
1991 3.7 2.1 4.0
1992 3.7 2.2 1.9 3.3 19.7
1993 3.5 1.9 2.4 1.8 2.1 16.5
1994 3.3 1.9 2.4 3.1 2.4 13.8
1995 3.0 1.5 3.0 2.9 2.5 11.4
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at
http://www.acda/gov/wmeat95/wmeatlst.htm .





1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Years
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at
http://www.acda/gov/wmeat95/wmeatlst.htm .
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Figure 5 Share ofDefense Expenditures in Selected CEE Countries, 1990-1995
(%ofGDP)
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